Analytic report

Moscow

1998

Like any complicated social phenomenon, corruption does not have a well-established, canonical definition. Nevertheless, the authors cannot avoid explaining the meaning of the term "corruption" when starting a serious discussion on the subject. This is not an academic problem, for it is dictated by the need to be understood properly by the readers.

In this report, we shall talk mainly about "state" corruption, implying that one of the parties is always a person who is either fulfilling the duties of a public servant, or exercising authority delegated to him by voters or in some other way. Ignoring certain terminological inconsistency, we shall use the following expressions as synonyms in this context; "public servant", "official", and "functionary".

State corruption exists insofar as an official has an opportunity to manage resources not owned by him by making or not making specific decisions. Such resources may include budget money, state or communal property, state purchase orders or privileges, etc. Collecting fines, tax or other payments prescribed by the law, the official also controls the resources that he does not own. If the fine (levy) is legal, then its owner is the state's treasury, otherwise, the owner is the person who is being shaken down by the official.

A public servant is obligated to make decisions on the basis of goals established by the law (the Constitution, and other laws and regulations) and by the publicly approved cultural and moral norms. Corruption emerges when these goals are replaced by the public servant's personal interests reflected in specific actions. This condition is sufficient for classifying such phenomena as the misuse of an official position in personal interests. The watershed between this phenomenon and corruption is rather blurred. A public servant can only rarely derive illegal benefits from his official position without involving other people in his unlawful activities, e.g., when an official covertly embezzles resources not owned by him (the term "kaznokradstvo" (embezzlement of public funds) used earlier may be relevant). One usually does not use the term "corruption" in such cases.

A different situation occurs more often. Below, several examples are given which can be labeled as cases usually described by the term "corruption".

1. When a commander of a military district builds his villa at the state's expense state (construction materials, engineering equipment, military servicemen), he does not act alone. He depends on other persons who are involved in the supply of materials and actual construction. Having used his power to illegally obtain material benefits, the commander is compelled to repay his "accomplices" by unlawful promotions in the service, bonuses, and in other ways. The situation is closer to the common concept of corruption since it involves not a single person but a group of officials who collectively derive profits from a violation of the law and regulations.

2. If an official obligated by the law to make a certain decision concerning another person (e.g., issue a license for some business activity) erects artificial obstacles, he induces his client to bribe-giving, which happens very often. This situation is closer to the traditional concept of corruption since it is related to giving and accepting a bribe. Such gifts for making a favorable decision which an official was obligated to make were called "mzdoimstvo" in the old school of Russian jurisprudence.

3 Most often the term corruption (in a narrow sense) is used in the situation when an official makes an unlawful decision (sometimes, a decision which is not acceptable in the public opinion) resulting in profits for a second party (e.g. a company securing a state purchase order in violation of the established rules), while the public servant himself obtains an illegal reward from this party. The specific features of this situation are as follows: a decision is made which violates the law or unwritten social rules; both parties act in mutual agreement; both parties obtain illegal profits and privileges; both parties try to conceal their activities.

4. Finally, situations occur when a public servant is forced by pressure or blackmail to make an unlawful decision. This usually happens to the officials already involved in criminal activity. Yielding to pressure, they actually obtain one very simple benefit: their activities are not revealed.

It would be relevant to remind the reader that the phenomenon of corruption is not limited to the aforementioned examples.

It is also useful to distinguish the top level and grassroots corruption. The former includes political figures, middle- and higher-level officials and is related to decisions that have a large impact (formulation of laws, government contracts, transfer of property rights, etc.). The latter, specific to the middle and low levels of bureaucracy, is related to the regular, day-to-day contacts between the officials and the public (fines, registrations, etc.)

Often, both parties in a corrupt deal belong to the same state body. For instance, when an official gives a bribe to his boss for covering up his corrupt activities, this, too, is corruption, often called the "vertical" one. It usually connects the top-level and the grassroots forms of corruption. Such corruption is especially alarming since it signals the development of corruption from the separate cases stage to the stage in which organized forms of corruption are entrenched.

The majority of experts consider buying of votes in an election as a form of corruption. All but one of the specific features of corruption are observable. The only exception is the absence of a public servant who was an active element in all the cases considered above. According to the Constitution, a voter possesses the resource called the "power authority". This authority is delegated by an elector to the elected persons by means of a specific form of decision making, i.e., voting. The elector is supposed to make the decision by considering who, in his opinion, will represent his interests in the best way. Such form of decision making is a publicly adopted norm. In case of vote-buying, the voter and the candidate make a deal. Its result is that the voter obtains money or other benefits for violating the norm mentioned above, while the candidate hopes to get the power resource in violation of the electoral legislation. Obviously, this is not the only type of corrupt activity in politics.

Finally, it is worth mentioning corruption in NGO's, the existence of which is admitted by the experts. An employee of an organization (either commercial, or non-profit) can control resources not owned by him, too. He is obligated to fulfill the institutional goals of his company, and has an opportunity for illegal enrichment by means of actions running counter to the interests of the company for the benefit of another party. Such situations are exemplified in today's Russia by credit funds obtained from commercial banks for projects that have only one purpose: to disappear into the thin air immediately after the money has been received.

1.1.2. Historical Background

The history of corruption is as old as the history of human civilization wherever it emerged: in Egypt, Rome, or ancient Israel. Bribe-taking (so-called "mzdoimstvo") is mentioned in Russian chronicles dating from the 13th century. Legal constraints on corruption were pioneered by Ivan III. His grandson Ivan the Terrible was first to introduce the capital punishment for excessive bribe-taking.

The only popular riot against corruption (of course, different terminology was used at the time) dates from the reign of the Russian tsar Alexei Mikhailovich Romanov. It occurred in 1648 and ended with the victory of the Muscovites. Part of the city burned to ashes, while a great number of city-dwellers and two corrupt "ministers" -Plescheyev, the head of the Land department ("Zemskoi prikaz"), and Trakhaniotov, the head of the Gunnery department ("Pushkarskii prikaz") - were slaughtered by the mob.

Under Peter the Great both corruption and the brutal tsar's struggle with it were flourishing. One of the striking episodes occurred when, after an investigation that took several years, Gagarin, the governor of Siberia, was convicted of bribe-taking and publicly hung. Three years later, however, Nesterov, the senior fiscal official who had revealed Gagarin's embezzlements, was publicly executed for bribery, too.

During the entire Romanov period, corruption was a considerable source of income for both petty and top-level bureaucrats. For instance, Bestuzhev-Ryumin, the Chancellor to Empress Elizabeth, received 7 thousand rubles a year for his service to the Russian crown while his services to the British crown (as an "agent of influence") were estimated as 12 thousand in the same currency.

Corruption was apparently inseparable from favoritism. The most striking examples from the pre-Revolutionary times apart from the infamous Grigory Rasputin are ballet-dancer Kshesinskaya and the great prince Alexei Mikhailovich. Both accepted huge bribes to help certain industrialists to get government military contracts during W.W.I.

Documents witness that the change of the state system and the form of government in October 1917 did not remove corruption as a phenomenon. Instead, there emerged a hypocritical attitude towards corruption that encouraged entrenchment of bribery in the new administrative system.

On May 2, 1918, Moscow revolutionary tribunal considered the case of the four members of the investigation commission who had been charged for bribe-taking and blackmail and convicted them to six months of imprisonment. V.I. Lenin, the chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars (SPK), became aware of the sentence and insisted on retrial. VTslK (Supreme Central Executive Committee) reconsidered the case and convicted three of the four to ten years of imprisonment. One can find in the archives Lenin's letter to D.I. Kursky concerning the urgent necessity to introduce legislation stipulating severe punishments for bribery. There is also Lenin's letter to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party with the proposal to include in the agenda an item on expelling the judges who give mild sentences in bribery cases. SPK Decree "On Bribery" of May 8, 1918, was the first legal document in Soviet Russia stipulating criminal prosecution for bribery (imprisonment for the term of not less than five years combined with forced labor for the same term). It is worth noting that the decree equaled an attempt to give or receive a bribe with the completed crime. The class approach was not forgotten. If the person giving a bribe belonged to the class of owners and was trying to keep his privileges, he was convicted to "the most heavy and harsh forced labor", while all his property was subject to the confiscation.

The history of the struggle between the Soviet power and corruption ended with the Soviet power itself without bringing any success. This fight has several interesting and important features.

First, the authorities avoided the term "corruption". Its use was allowed only in the late 80's. The terms "bribery", "misuse of the official position", "connivance", etc. were used instead. Denying the term meant denying the concept and, hence, the phenomenon itself. Because of that, the analysis of the phenomenon was doomed to failure, and so was the fight with its individual manifestations that were subject to criminal prosecution.

Second (and this aspect is very closely related to "First"), the Soviet "law conscience" always explained the reasons for corruption phenomena in an amazingly naive and unproductive way. A secret letter of the CPSU Central Committee of March 29, 1962, "On strengthening the struggle with bribery and embezzlement of public property" claimed that corruption is "a social phenomenon generated by the conditions of the exploitation-based society". The October revolution removed the basic roots of bribery and "the Soviet administration and management system is the system of a new type". The document gave reasons for corruption as the shortcomings of the work in party, trade union and state bodies, and first of all in the domain of personal development of the working people.

The text was copied verbatim from the very first to last years of the Soviet system in an unchanged pattern.

It is stated in the letter of the Department of administrative bodies of the Central Committee of the CPSU and of the Committee of Party Control on the strengthening of struggle with bribery in 1975-80 of May 21, 1981, that in 1980, more then 6,000 cases of bribery were revealed, which is 50% more than in 1975. The same letter tells about the emergence of organized groups (giving as an example a more than 100-strong group in the Ministry of Fishery headed by a deputy minister). Examples are given of the conviction of ministers and deputy ministers in national republics, in other federal ministries, of the penetration of criminals into law enforcement bodies, of bribery and embezzlement in prosecutor's offices and courts.

Major types of crimes are listed in the letter: shipping of goods that are in short supply, supply of equipment and materials, revision and lowering of planned tasks, promotion to various important positions, concealment of embezzlements. The main reasons, as quoted in the letter, are: serious shortcomings in the selection of personnel, red-tape bureaucracy in processing citizens' requests, unsatisfactory work with the complaints and letters of the citizens, gross violations of the state, financial, and plan discipline, liberal attitude to bribe-takers (in particular, in court sentences), unsatisfactory work with the public opinion. Facts are quoted concerning punishment of high-level party officials (at the level of city and district party committees) for connivance to bribery. The letter suggests that a decree of the Central Committee has to be issued.

The close relationship between the weak understanding of the corruption phenomena, primitive explanations of the underlying reasons, and inadequate methods of cracking down on corruption are easily noticeable.

Third, the hypocrisy of the authorities which facilitated entrenchment of corruption manifested itself in the impunity of the higher-level Soviet and party officials. As rare exceptions from the rule, one can mention the cases of Tarada and Medunov, high-level officials in the Krasnodarsky krai, and Schelokov's case. When Sushkov, a deputy minister of foreign trade, was convicted for bribes and embezzlements, the KGB and the General Prosecutor's office reported to the central Committee about revelations made during the investigation: Patolichev, the minister of foreign trade, regularly accepted expensive golden jewelry, other precious items, and rare golden coins as gifts from the representatives of foreign companies. The case was dropped quietly.

A unique but almost forgotten case was described in the book "Bribery and corruption in Russia" written by A. Kirpichnikov, who in the early 60s was investigating a major embezzlement case in "Lenminvodtorg" (Leningrad city department of mineral water retail trading). The investigation unraveled a ramified network of bribe-taking that included high-level officials of the City Department of Internal Affairs (GUVD) and the CPSU city committee and, eventually, reached the chairman of the city Soviet (member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the CPSU Central Committee). Investigation ended when the city prosecutor's office was reshuffled. The prosecutor was not allowed to continue the investigation. The very fact that the case ended in court can be explained by the political struggle which was waged at that time at the highest levels of the CPSU.

Fourth, campaigns against corruption in the administration were carried on only by the representatives of the administration itself. This had two consequences. The campaigners were intrinsically unable to remove the causes of corruption since the latter were tightly bound to the most vital conditions of the system's own existence. The anticorruption campaign very often developed into a struggle against competitors in the corruption market (as it was in the times of Peter I - see above).

Fifth, corruption quite often proved to be the only channel for introducing market relations into the planned economy. Fighting against the laws of nature cannot result in a success. That was the reason for the entrenchment of corruption in its role as the organizer of the shadow market. That was the reason for the expansion of corruption after weakening of the totalitarian state.

The old regime had its last chance to influence the state of affairs in the corruption-related issues in July 1991. The Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee issued a Decree "On Urgent Measures for Fighting With Economic Crimes". Amazingly, this decree did not even mention corruption or bribery.

During the postwar years, in the times of perestroika and its aftermath, expansion of corruption proceeded as the state machinery was weakening in the background. It was accompanied by the following processes: decreasing of the centralized control pressure, then falling apart of ideological constraints, economic stagnation followed by plummeting of the industrial output, then the collapse of the USSR and the birth of a new country - Russia - which could be considered a state only nominally at first. Gradually, the organized crime of the centralized state was replaced by a "federate" compound of a multitude of corrupt systems.

Thus the current state of corruption in Russia is largely explained by the trends which already existed long ago and by the transitional stage which was accompanied, as happened in other countries in the same situation, by the growth of corruption. The most important factors pre-determining the growth of corruption and rooted in the country's history (alongside with dysfunctioning of the state system and some historical and cultural traditions) are:

• an impetuous transition to the new economic system not supported by the necessary legal base and law-based culture;

• absence in the Soviet times of a normal legal system and cultural traditions based on respect for the law,

• collapse of the party control system.

1.1.3. Corruption Abroad

A short historical essay which was given above may cause grim feelings and aggravate the sense of doom. For this reason, the authors consider it necessary to stress that corruption is an international phenomenon. It is inherent to all countries irrespective to their political systems and the level of economic development. Only the scale matters.

No country can consider itself protected from corruption. Switzerland, famous for its incorruptible public servants was shocked in 1994 by a tremendous scandal caused by one of the officials of the Zurich canton. An inspector of bars and restaurants was charged with accepting bribes totaling almost $2 min. Immediately after that an investigation was launched against five inspectors of the Swiss government who were assisting some companies in obtaining government contracts. Then two more scandals broke out.

France had its share of massive investigations of corrupt activities by businessmen and political figures. In 1993, the prime-minister promised for the first time that he would not hinder these investigations. "The situation in France gradually changes, as recently as 10 years ago it was forbidden to investigate cases of bribery and corruption", claims a French judge Jean-Pierre Thierry.

Numerous cases of corruption in Italy engulfed the highest political circles. The investigation in Milan launched in 1992 ended in the appearance before courts of more then 700 businessmen and political figures.

In September 1996, a special conference was held in Berlin which was devoted to struggle with corruption. According to the documents reported at the conference prosecutor offices in many major German cities conduct investigations of thousands of. corruption cases. In Frankfurt-am-Main they number more than a thousand, about 600 in Munich, 400 in Hamburg and about 200 in Berlin. In 1995, almost 3,000 cases of bribery were officially registered in the country. In 1994, almost 1,500 people appeared before courts, in 1995, their number increased to more then 2,000. Experts believe that these figures are only a tip of the iceberg. The corruption engulfed departments checking foreign refugees, registration offices of new cars and other state bodies. One can illegally "buy" for cash a license for operating a restaurant or a casino, a driver's license, a license for towing illegally parked cars. The construction industry is the one which is most strongly infected by corruption.

From time to time we witness tremendous corruption scandals which "implicate" leaders of major countries and heads of respected international organizations. Bribe amounts exceed by many times the income of Russian bribe-takers. An international non-profit organization "Transparency International" (hereafter, TI) which fights against corruption at the national and international levels and in business claimed in one of its reports: "It (corruption - authors' remark) became a feature of the day-today life in many leading industrial countries. However, their riches and stable political institutions allow them to conceal the scale of losses inflicted by corruption on the social and humanitarian aspects of life". A survey carried out in 1995 by TI's national branches revealed that "corruption in the state sector acquires the same forms and affects the same aspects of life regardless of whether it occurs in a developed or underdeveloped country".

Classification of countries according to the degree of corruption which is based on the East - West division is absolutely irrelevant. Historical research provides numerous examples of corruption brought to colonies by Western colonizers. For instance, Indonesia was "infected" with corruption by the officials of the Dutch East India company, corruption was brought to the Philippines by Spanish colonizers and to India by the British administration. Philippines and Bangladesh which rioted against corrupted military regimes provide examples supporting the statement that corruption is not an intrinsic element of the Oriental cultural tradition. Singapore and some other developing countries may be considered as examples of the successful implementation of anti-corruption state programs.

When comparing today's Russia with the industrially developed countries famous for their century-long democratic traditions one has to keep in mind that we are trying to make comparison between social organisms standing at different levels of development of democracy and market institutions. It should like to remind the reader that the tradition of consistent (and not always successful) struggle with corruption in "Western democracies" is only some 20-30 years old while the democratic evolution of those countries has been more then tens of times longer.

1.1.4. International Aspects of Corruption

Developing political and economical cooperation makes corruption an international problem. Russia is becoming more open to the world and thus subject to the same trend. One can distinguish the following channels of international corruption.

Corruption in international organizations exists due to general tendencies: resources (e.g. aid to participating or sponsored countries) are distributed; the distribution is conducted by officials who are not the owners of the resources. Moreover, officials in international organizations operate under less stringent control than their colleagues in national bodies scrutinized by national public organizations. All of these create corruption which, due to specific features of the international bodies' operation, is much less risky to the participants. ATI publication claims, e.g., that "Embezzlement of budget funds in the European Union has become an enormous problem..."

Recently, publications appeared in the Russian press that talked about mysterious disappearance of funds obtained as aid from international organizations. There are good reasons to believe that frauds were the manifestations of corruption of that kind.

Corruption in international economical cooperation reveals itself when joint ventures are established, investment projects are implemented, state property is privatized, production is shared and in many other forms. No country is insured against corruption of that kind. A report by US experts claims that in 1994, 80% of major contracts were given to foreign companies offering bribes for the deal.

A strange situation emerged in Russia. On the one hand, many foreign businessmen justly complain on corrupt officials hindering normal economical cooperation. More then 70/o of businessmen dealing with Russia and other CIS countries were convinced that corruption is one of the main obstacles on the way of normal entrepreneurship in Russia. D. Wolfensohn, the president of the World Bank, said during his visit to Moscow in 1996: "After the end of the Cold war corruption became the main obstacle on the way of democratic development".

On the other hand, many representatives of foreign companies are not scrupulous with respect to bribery for gaining privileges in a competitive marketplace. Moreover, tax legislation in many countries favors such behavior. The only exception are the US laws forbidding American businessmen to resort to bribery on the territory of other countries. One can state without strong exaggeration that foreign business in Russia brings its noticeable contribution to the expansion of corruption in our country.

Smuggling of illegal revenues abroad lowers the risk of corruption deals and, because of this, boosts corruption. Many countries suffer from such activity. One can quote dozens of examples when leaders of developing countries were hiding in foreign banks their wealth totaling billions of dollars which was obtained by means of corruption.

Smuggling of capital from Russia has long become a problem of the national financial and economic systems. A considerable part of this money flow consists of illegal income and, in particular, that from corrupt deals. A channel for this flow is created by the absence of bi- and multilateral agreements with the participation of Russia concerning arrests of deposits, extradition of criminals, etc.

Concluding this section, we should like to remind the reader about the existence of feedback, i.e., influence of national corruption on various important aspects of the international life. One example will suffice. Adolf Hitler came to power by exploiting, among others, the slogan of the corruptness of the Weimar republic. One hardly needs a proof that Hitler's coming to power turned out to be a fact far beyond the national limits.

In the discussions of the current situation in Russia large-scale corruption became commonplace. In 1995-96, national and regional newspapers and magazines published more than 3 thousand articles on corruption, TV showed more than 150 programs on the subject. More than 60% of respondents in sociological polls believe that corruption is a factor threatening Russia's national security, more than 70% agree with the statement that Russia may be considered a corrupt state.

Beyond any doubts, corruption negatively affects all aspects of life. The impact of corruption which is described below is already observable in Russia to varying extent.

1. Expansion of the shadow economy results in the drying out of tax revenues to the budget and the weakening of the latter. As a result, the state loses leverages for management of the national economy. Social problems are aggravated because of budget failure.

2. Mechanisms of market competition fail since the winners often prove to be not the most competitive agents of the market but those who gained privileges by bribing. As a result, market efficiency breaks down, casting doubts on the concept of market competition.

3. Emergence of new efficient owners slows down, first of all due to frauds in the privatization process. The impact is the same as in item 2.

4. Budget funds are used ineffectively, in particular when government contracts and credits are distributed. Because of that, budget issues are put under stronger pressure.

5. Prices soar because of "corruption overheads". Eventually they are paid by the consumer.

6. Market agents lose their confidence in the ability of authorities to establish and commit to fair rules of the market game. The climate for investments worsens and, consequently, economy collapses, renovation of basic production assets remain unsolved.

7. The scale of corruption in nongovernmental bodies (companies, non-profit organizations) grows, undermining their efficiency and, hence, the efficiency of the national economy as a whole.

1. Vast resources are distracted from the goals of public development. As a result, the budget crisis deteriorates, the authorities' ability to solve social problems shrinks.

2. Wealth disparity and the poverty of the bulk of population are permanent and keep increasing. Corruption boosts unfair and unlawful redistribution of resources in favor of narrow oligarchic groups at the expense of the most vulnerable strata of society.

3. The law as the main tool regulating the life of the state and society is distrusted. An image of the citizen lacking protection from both crime and the state emerges in the public conscience.

4. Corruptness of law-enforcement bodies promotes strengthening of the organized crime. The latter intermingles with corrupted officials and entrepreneurs and becomes even stronger, gaining access to political power and channels for money laundering.

5. Social tension increases, putting the national economy and political stability in the country under a threat.

1. Political goals deviate from the tasks of national development to securing political power for oligarchic groups.

2. Trust for the authorities shrinks, they become more and more alienated from society. Because of that, all good intentions of the authorities are put under threat.

3. The prestige of the country in international affairs plummets, a threat of its political and economic isolation looms.

4. Competition in the political struggle becomes a farce. Citizens become more and more disillusioned in the democratic values. The threat of the decay of the democratic institutions looms.

5. The menace of the collapse of emerging democracy is increasingly strong. There exists a threat of democracy being crushed by a dictatorship coming to power on the wave of anti-corruption crackdown.

1.2.2. Economic Losses Related to Corruption

The scale of losses inflicted on Russia by corruption can be estimated in terms of a monetary equivalent in a very approximate way.

To obtain estimates of the losses caused by top-level corruption, we address well-known examples when such losses could be determined.

First, it was calculated in Italy that after the anticorruption operation "Clean hands", state expenditures on road building decreased by 20%.

Second, it is worth mentioning the results of recent research carried out at Harvard which were quoted by P. Bennet. Decreasing the country's corruptness from the level of Mexico to that of Singapore brings an effect which is equivalent to an increase of 20/o in tax collection.

Applying the estimate to the total amount of taxes collected in Russia in 1997 (which constitutes, according to a government statement, 65% of the sum planned by the budget), one computes that 20% constitute 49 trillion (undenominated) rubles. This sum exceeds the combined expenditures on science, education, health care, culture and art allocated in the last year's budget.

??In some report looses from market corruption has been estimated. Looses emerge because of commercial transactions made not on the basis of price or merit but as the result of bribes, kickbacks, or extortion. It has been variously estimated that such corruption adds between 5 and 15 percent to the cost of all goods and services.

??A general excess cost of 15 percent is the equivalent of a tax to the average worker, with a median annual income of $23000, of $3450 per year. If made available for productive purposes, that could be expected to increase the number of jobs by about 10 percent, or about 12 million jobs, which would be more than enough to absorb the entire unemployed population of the U.S., estimated to be about 10 million, and could also be expected to raise average income by about 10 percent, and add about 5 percent to the average annual growth of the GDP.

Third, it is worth mentioning the case of a British official of the Defense ministry who was convicted for 4 years in prison for accepting bribes. Their sum totaled $2.25 mln. Experts of the TI's branch in UK determined that losses inflicted by the official's activities amounted to $ 200 min, exceeding by almost one hundred times the total amount of bribes. Many domestic examples show that the ratio of the amount of bribes to the losses inflicted by corrupt actions may be even more striking.

Fourth, special attention has to be paid to the source of top-level corruption which is most widely spread, i.e. government contracts and bulk purchases. The estimates of the related losses - and those are the largest, as a rule - were computed most frequently. According to these estimates, the losses from corruption in this sphere often exceed 30% of the total budget expenditures on these items. (Given this coefficient, crackdown on corruption in the army and military industry alone can yield almost 8 trillion of undenominated rubles).

Udo Miller, head of the Audit Сhamber of the land Gessen (Germany), claims that bribes amount to 20% of the amount of contracts. The bribes are not paid in cash, they are transferred instead to the corrupt officials' accounts through fake companies or are paid in the form of excessive payments for the work done. Experts estimate that the cost of about 40% of buildings constructed by the orders of federal, land or local authorities is too high. General prosecutor of Frankfurt-am-Main claims that corruption in the construction industry causes losses totaling DM 10 bin annually. This is done, in particular, by overestimating the real market price of the work by 30%.

Dieter Frisch, former Director-General for the development of the European Union, notes that when losses due to economically unjustified and corrupt projects begin increasing in a country, the losses are not limited to 10-20% overspending caused by, bribing, but include as a rule the entire cost of the unproductive and unnecessary projects.

One can add to the quoted examples the estimates made by Russian law-enforcement bodies. According to these estimates, criminal groups in some branches of industry (oil and gas industry, mining of rare metals) spend up to 50% of their revenues (real, not declared) on bribing officials at various levels. Using the relation between the size of bribes and corruption-related losses, one can find that the latter amount to billions of dollars.

We proceed now to grassroots corruption. Experts of the non-profit organization "21st century Technologies" estimated that small entrepreneurs across the country spend a minimum of $ 500 min monthly on bribes to officials! The annual total of bribes amounts then to $ 6 bin. (It should be added that the quoted estimates do not include the payments of small entrepreneurs to their so called "roof's). A preliminary analysis shows that 10% of total revenues in small- and middle-size business are spent on corrupt deals. It is worth noting that in the early stages of a business (registration of the company, etc.), expenses are considerably higher. "Creating a business" requires permissions of about 50 officials. These losses are offloaded to the ordinary customers and clients of small business since expenditures on bribes are included in the price of goods and services.

One can also add an almost unexplored and virtually uncontrolled corruption within companies and nongovernmental organizations (e.g., providing a credit from a commercial bank in exchange for a bribe) which also undermines the efficiency of the economy.

To conclude, the combined corruption-related losses in our country may amount annually to $ 10-20 bin. The data and the estimates were not quoted to surprise or scare a reader. One should notice another aspect of the struggle with corruption: investments in a coherent offensive on the corruption may turn out to be very profitable.

Corruption, its scale, dynamics and specific features are consequences of the general political and socio-economic problems of the country. Corruption always starts its offensive when a country enters in a period of modernization. Russia now undergoes not just a modernization but a radical renovation of its public, state and economic foundations. It is no wonder that the country follows the basic rules of development including negative ones.

The relationship between corruption and the problems creating it occurs in both directions. On the one hand, the problems strengthen corruption and their solution may positively affect the level of corruptness. On the other hand, large-scale corruption preserves and aggravates the problems of the transitional period, thus hindering their solution. One can conclude that corruption can be diminished and limited by concurrent solution of the problems that create it and, also, solving the problems may be eased by attacking corruption with all the determination and in all directions.

General problems creating corruption are specific not only to Russia but also to the majority of countries in a modernization stage and, first of all, those experiencing a transition period from a centralized to market economy. Below we consider some of these problems.

1. Problems related to the overcoming of heritage of the totalitarian regime. One should mention slow withdrawal from the proximity of power and the absence of control over it which obviously created favorable conditions for flourishing of corruption. It would be relevant to remind in this respect that fascist Germany was one of the most corrupt regimes in the human history. (Those who hope to crack down on corruption with a "strong hand" should remember this fact).

Another problem is to overcome the intermingling of power and economy which is specific to totalitarian regimes with the centralized system of economic management. A natural division of labor between power institutions which are responsible for creating the conditions for normal functioning of the economy and free market agents has not emerged yet. Administrative bodies in Russia, especially on the regional level, keep playing on the economic field according to the rules which they established for themselves. Such situation inevitably creates corruption.

It is worth recalling that rapid and radical changes in Russia occur with the bulk of state officials keeping their posts. Moreover, many of those who keep their posts were not capable of adjusting to the new conditions and launching a business of their own and using their talent, professional skills or even their connections. It means that the people who remained were not the best, those who keep adhering to the old-day traditions of the proximity of power and its interference in all aspects of life. At the same time, there remained (and also came to the office) those who consider an administrative post a tool for their personal enrichment.

2. Economic collapse and political instability. Impoverishment of the population, inability of the state to ensure a decent existence to public servants push both sides to violations of law which result in mass-scale grassroots corruption. This trend was supported by the Soviet-time traditions of protectionism ("blat") as a form of grassroots corruption.

Concurrently, the permanently present political risk related to long-term investments, harsh economic situation (inflation, clumsy and irrelevant interference of the state into economic affairs, absence of clear-cut regulatory norms) mold a certain type of the economic behavior that aims at extremely short-term goals, at the potentially large, although perhaps risky, profit. People of this behavioral type are very close to seeking profit by means of corruption.

Political instability creates lack of confidence in public servants at different levels. In the absence of any guarantees for survival in these conditions, officials become more prone to the temptations of bribe-taking.

In the conditions of an economic crisis, the state attempts, as it was done in Russia, to increase the tax pressure. These actions enlarge the shadow-economy zone and, consequently, the field of corruption. For instance, a businessman who evades taxes is already at the mercy of a tax inspector and becomes an easy prey for urges to give a bribe in exchange for a promise to save him from punishment.

3. Underdeveloped legislature and legal loopholes. In the transition period, the legislature lags behind the pace of renovation of fundamental basics of the economy and the economic life. It is worth recalling that the first steps of privatization in Russia (its "nomenclature" stage) were made in the absence of any legal regulations or strict controls.

Before, under the Soviet regime, the cause for corruption was control over the distribution of the basic resources, i.e. funds. At the first stages of reforms, officials radically diversified the forms of control, which they expanded over credits, privileges, licenses, privatization contests, choice of authorized banks, of agents for the implementation of major social projects etc. Economic liberalization was combined with, first, obsolete principles of state control over resource distribution (see item 1. above) and, second, with the absence of legal norms regulating activity in these new spheres. Such situation is specific to the transitional period, while at the same time serving as a perfect ground for flourishing corruption.

Until today, there are considerable loopholes in the issues of property ownership. This refers first of all to land ownership. Unlawful selling of land creates a powerful (low of corrupt deals. One should also add a plethora of ill-defined transitional forms of mixed ownership spreading the responsibility and allowing businessmen to operate like public servants and officials to operate like businessmen.

Underdeveloped legislature manifests itself in poor awareness of the law, imperfections of the legal system as a whole and ill-defined legislative procedures. Here various forms of corruption are created by:

• intrinsic inconsistency of the legislature and even of some laws allowing officials to create ideal conditions for exhorting bribes and blackmailing citizens (applicants);

• unfinished laws featuring plenty of ambiguous formulations, loopholes and numerous cross-references. As a result, final "production" of laws is substituted by regulatory norms developed by local authorities virtually without any control. Thus wonderful conditions emerge for the issuance of ill-formulated, "closed", hardly accessible regulations that create favorable conditions for corruption;

• absence of legislative procedures for developing regulatory and executive norms (laws, presidential decrees, governmental decrees, etc.), easing the way to corruption. The situation is aggravated by the overall negligence to adhere strictly to procedural norms.

4. Inefficiency of the power institutions. Totalitarian regimes create cumbersome systems of state management. This refers first of all to the executive branch. Bureaucratic structures are very sturdy and adjust easily to survival under most severe shocks. Moreover, the more radical the changes, the more energy and inventiveness shown by the bureaucratic structures in the struggle for survival. As a result, life rapidly changes and the bureaucratic institutions and thus the system of state management as a whole lag behind these changes. In the times of the late Soviet Union and early Russia one could easily observe the reaction of the system to increasingly complicated and multiplying problems. The shortcomings of the system were flourishing, staff was swelling, new hierarchical levels of management were introduced, coordinating structures responsible for nothing were mushrooming. The result was straightforward and simple: the more complicated and clumsy the management system, the larger the gap between its structure and the problems it has to solve, the easier entrenchment of corruption in it.

At the first stages of the reforms, the state could barely use all the power of the state machinery and the power of the law for protecting the rights of ownership, for ensuring unconditional fulfillment of the rules of the game. In the absence of protection from the state, an entrepreneur seeks protection from specific officials. Relations between them established in this way later develop easily into corruption-based ones.

Inefficiency of the state also manifests itself in the inability to establish, after the collapse of the nomenclature-based structures, a new modern system for selection and promotion of public servants. As a result, the new wave of public servants brought many crooks seeking positions in the state management structures with premeditated plans to misuse the office for purposes that are very far from noble. Very often, direct infiltration of "agents of influence" from commercial structures to administrations at different levels is observed.

5. Weakness of civil society, alienation of power from society. A democratic state can solve its problems only in cooperation with the institutions of civil society. Worsening socio-economic situation of citizens that always accompanies the first stages of renovation, disillusionment replacing old hopes create alienation of the authorities from society, isolation of the former. At the same time, neither grassroots, nor top-level corruption can be attacked without support from public organizations.

6. Weakly established democratic political traditions. Infiltration of corruption into the political life is also caused by:

• lack of political culture manifesting itself in particular in elections when voters readily give their votes for cheap handouts or become prey to obvious demagoguery;

• undeveloped party system: parties are not able to carry the responsibility for training and promotion of their representatives;

• shortcomings of the electoral legislation which protects by the deputy corps by all means while not ensuring a real control of the elects by the voters and in this way provoking fraudulent financing of election campaigns. Thus corruption is laid into the foundation of the representative branch of power already at the time of the elections.

Real political competition may serve as a counterbalance and limitation to corruption in the political life on the one hand and to the political extremism on the other. It results in diminishing the probability of political turmoil. An expert on the problems of corruption reminds that only the emergence of such a competition allowed to a gradual decrease in corrupt elections in England in the middle of 19th century.

Fictitious political life, political opposition deprived of a possibility to influence the situation push political figures of the opposition to trade their political capital for an economic one. In this way a smooth transition is made from a semilegal lobbyism to undisguised corruption.

1.3.2. Specific Problems of Russia

The problems described below are an extension of those which by their causes or origin are rooted in the Soviet period. Some of them are aggravated by the harsh conditions of the transitional period (the subject was touched upon above).

Nowadays the weakness of Russian judiciary system manifests itself in:

• the Fiscal and executive branches of power fail to provide for maintenance of judges and operation of courts;

• court decisions are seldom implemented;

• low effectiveness of arbitrage courts results in long delays in case processing and, consequently, paralysis of economic activity;

• shortage of skilled and knowledgeable personnel matching to the requirements imposed by the new economic conditions.

Amassed potential of civil courts is virtually not utilized in the confrontation with corruption.

Absence of an administrative judiciary system does not allow to alleviate the burden of cases on administrative violations carried by criminal and civil courts. It binders solution of many problems in the sphere which is most closely related to corruption.

2. Underdevelopment of the public legal conscience originates from the same cause: the system of Soviet quasi-law which was entrenched during Soviet times. Besides weak implementation of laws and regulatory norms, the absence of culture and traditions of using the law by citizens and other similar phenomena are observed, in particular, suppressed legal immunity results in the virtually absent resistance to "grassroots" corruption.

3. Habitual bias of the law-enforcement bodies and their representatives to protection of only "state interests" and "people's property" is a specifically Russian feature. Protection of rights and interests of citizens, including private owners, has not become the main task of the law-enforcement bodies. Not having found protection in the legal sphere, entrepreneurs tend to seek it by means of buying unlawful services from the officials.

4, Tradition of the official's commitment not to law but to instructions and the boss is rooted in the times much more ancient then the 70 years of the Soviet regime. As a result, all the attempts to introduce legal regulation get stuck in the obsolete bureaucratic system operating according by its own rules established several centuries . ago. Any anti-corruption program in Russia has to be combined with radical reform of the state-service system.

1.3.3. Economic Conditions for Corruption

State corruption exists insofar as the state interferes in the private, public and economic life. A state exercising its function has to interfere. The problem, however, is how effective this interference proves to be. Thus, corruption may be considered, first of all, as a signal of clumsy, unjustified and ineffective actions of the state.

Recently, extensive changes occurred in the economic sphere, new unfamiliar forms of economic activity emerged and the state power institutions met serious problems in adjusting to them. Here an explosion of corruption was observed in the most noticeable way. Below we give a list of economy branches nourishing corruption where the state is present. The list, which is far from comprehensive, includes:

1. Privatization of state property is always a serious cause of corruption. The problem was aggravated in Russia by the scale of privatization and weak control over its implementation. According to the information from the law-enforcement bodies, at the first stages of privatization about 30% of all decrees already contained violations of the current legislation. Inclusion of an official in the pool of shareholders was a widespread practice. According to the information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs every tenth breach of trust among those revealed from mid 1994 till mid 1997 was committed in the privatization sphere (5,600). The most widespread breaches are the financial embezzlement and bribery. In almost half of Russian regions officials from the local administrations, territory committees on state property management and state property funds were convicted.

One should add numerous cases which do not entail criminal persecution: the cost of the privatized property is underestimated, manipulation of tender conditions, mass buying of enterprises by officials trough trustees. It is not an accident that privatization has recently become a battlefield for politic clashes where powerful weapons -compromising materials and accusations of corruption - are widely used.

Infringements damaging the federal budget and quite often connected with corruption, most frequently arise under the following circumstances:

• receipt of the taxes and payments in the federal budget;
• money offsets;
• reception of the connected foreign credits;
• attraction of the credits of commercial banks under guarantees and surety of the Ministry of Finance of Russia on behalf of Government; paper and other credits;
• renewal of debts of the enterprises and organizations of the subjects of Federation on a state internal duty to Russian Federation and allocation of the financial help to the subjects of Russian Federation;
• unwarranted high delayed debt receivable;
• non-purpose and inefficient use of means of the federal budget.

Experts claim that almost half of all decisions on issuing state credits or distribution of budget resources from states coffers is accompanied by bribes. The situation is nurtured by the clumsy tax system which stipulates that money collected in regions first go to the state coffers and after that return to the regions in the form of transfers. Corruption is boosted by the unrealistic budget. It allows officials to make decisions who will be the first to obtain financial means, who will receive money earlier and who later. For the same reason of underfinancing, various non-budget funds are established under the aegis of various state bodies. Manipulations with these funds are also a good source for nourishing corruption. Absence of control over expenditures of the budget funds in regions also creates corruption on this level of authority.

Distribution of budget resources proceeds also through placing of government contracts and bulk purchases. Until recently, this sphere featured complete closeness and absence of any control. These factors were most corrupting in the distribution and use of state resources in the army.

3. Granting exclusive rights (privileges, including those for export and import operations, taxes, licensing, etc.) is an excellent ground for corruption. When a draft project of the administrative reform was in the preparation stage, personnel of governmental agencies was polled. The questionnaire contained, in particular, a question concerning powers which the agency lacks. The right to issue licenses was one of the most frequent wishes.

One should include in this item such causes of emerging corruption as deferred payments of taxes, providing privileges to companies taking credits or budget resources, prolongation of credit agreements, provision of state guarantees, budget preferences materialized in the form of "development budget".

Regional authorities exhibit the same vigor as the federal ones in using their rights to grant privileges in exchange for bribes. According to information from the General prosecutor's office in 1995 in Stavropol krai alone 130 crimes committed by officials were exposed.

4. Banking system was one of the first in Russia to launch reforms. Actually in late 80s -early 1990s unregulated privatization of a considerable part of the state-owned banking system occurred. Establishment of the system of trustee banks whereto state resources were transferred for management was for the banks, in the conditions of raging inflation, a source for obtaining tremendous revenues. In this sphere too corruption naturally became deeply entrenched.

Cooperation of officials with commercial banks allowed to civilize a form of bribery. Traditional envelopes (and later briefcases) with cash were replaced by low-interest credits, interest rates tens of times higher then the regular ones and other more sophisticated forms of expressing gratitude.

In 1996, the General prosecutor's office reported its concern about the situation in the Central bank of Russia and its territorial branches. The number of criminal cases launched against employees of credit and financial institutions who were charged with accepting bribes in the period from 1993 to 1995 was growing virtually exponentially (it implies that corrupt official multiplied as a colony of bacteria in a an active culture medium): 48 cases in 1993, 93 in 1994 and 143 in 1995.

5. Unlawful lobbying in legislative bodies is virtually beyond any control and criminal persecution. The reason is the hypertrophied deputies' immunity. For that reason the number of legislators among the officials convicted for actions which can be qualified as corruption (though this term is absent in the criminal code) a modest 3%. It is not clear whether one should be calmed by a price-list on corruption services exhibited in the State Duma (which was distributed in Duma and published in a number of papers). The prices are an order of magnitude smaller then those paid for similar services to legislators in countries with a more developed democratic system.

6. Intermingling of law-enforcement bodies and economic crimes creates a medium which binders the crackdown on corruption. "Special teams" are organized which make money on wrecking criminal cases. Pressure of law-enforcement bodies on competitors can be arranged for bribes. The same means are used for blackmailing. Many cases are known when officers of the law-enforcement bodies were employed ("as a part-time job") by commercial structures and established such structures under the aegis of the law-enforcement bodies. Relatives of high-rank officials from tax inspection or customs irrespective of their professional skills are nominated to well-paid posts in commercial structures (relatives of some high-rank officials from other governmental bodies prove to be equally lucky).

In 1995, 270 cases of the illegal commercial activity of tax inspectors were exposed. In 1996, 404 officers of the internal affairs departments were subject to the criminal persecution. Majority of crimes in the customs (about 40%) are committed with the concurrent acceptance of bribes.

Corruption infiltrates courts. In such conditions lawyers make bribes an effective tool for the defense of their clients.

1.3.4. Conditions for Grassroots Corruption

Sociological polls show that 98% of drivers offered a bribe to a highway patrol officer at least once. This figure not only signals a high level of corruptness in this system but also evidences a public conscience that is strongly infected by corruption. Grassroots corruption is deeply entrenched in the everyday life of society.

Attractiveness of grassroots corruption is explained by the fact that with a minimal risk for both parties it possesses a specific value not only for the person accepting (or exhorting) a bribe but also for the person who offers this bribe. A bribe helps to solve permanently emerging routine problems. It serves also as a modest payment for minor violations of laws and regulations. A money bill attached to the driver's license may prove to be useful when it is necessary to exceed the speed limit or to drive a car drunken. (In Moscow the bribe for avoiding punishment for drunk driving varies from $ 100 to $ 300 depending on the model of the car).

Wide-scale grassroots corruption is extremely dangerous. First, it creates a favorable psychological background for the existence of other form of corruption and, second, it nurtures vertical corruption. The latter is a launch pad for emergence of organized corrupted structures and groups.

Grassroots corruption in Russia penetrates into all spheres where a citizen has to get in contact with the state or, vice versa, the state summons a citizen. Below we list the main aspects of the problem.

1. Housing and communal system, as sociological polls show, is considered by people as the most corrupt one. Emergence of the housing market seemed to suppress corruption in this domain. However it proved to be very strongly entrenched. This is a glaring example of the conclusion that measures aiming at the liquidation of economic conditions for corruption alone may prove to be insufficient for eliminating it.

2. Law-enforcement bodies and, first of all, militia, occupy the disgraceful second place. Lately, one quarter of those convicted for bribery are the officers of the law-enforcement bodies. The largest contribution to this figure is brought, as it was stated above, by the highway militia. Besides highways, citizens make corruption-tainted deals with the law-enforcement bodies when obtaining driver's licenses, permissions for keeping fire-arms and in other similar cases.

3. Taxes and custom fees are an excellent "active culture medium" for grassroots corruption. Polling of seasoned Russian "shuttle-traders" reveals that there is not a single one of them who has not offered a bribe to a customs officer at least once.

4. Conscription to the army service in recent years meets permanent difficulties. It would be relevant to note that according to preliminary estimates more than half of young men exempted from the military service obtained the exemption by means of bribery.

In addition to the cases listed above it's worth mentioning a number of situations related to corruption with high probability :

• collection of fines and other payments from the population by various agencies;

• issuing licenses for various business activities;

• granting permits for construction and distribution of land lots;

• control activities of various state agencies (fire and sanitary inspections, etc.) exploiting small business in Russia.

Interaction of power with the citizen occurs in two cases. The first one takes place when power has to render the citizen some service(s) (grant a permission or issue a document). In such case corruption is nurtured (besides causes listed in the previous sections) by:

• existence of a wide sphere of services rendered by the state which require obtaining a permit;

• unawareness by the citizens of their rights for obtaining a service and the officials' duties in rendering the service;

• concealing of information concerning rights and obligations of the citizens by officials;

• complicated bureaucratic procedures;

• monopoly of the state agencies on providing services;

• structural peculiarities of the power authorities when the same department possesses the power to make decisions and to render services on their basis.

The second situation occurs when power exercising its normalizing and regulatory function obligates a citizen to share his resources with the state by imposing mandatory payments or fines for violations of current regulations. In this situation corruption (in addition to causes listed above) is nurtured by:

• inadequate scale of fines promoting evasion of payments by means of bribery.

1.3.5. Social and Psychological Conditions for Corruption

The morality and the psychological climate in the society affect strongly the level of corruptness. Majority of officials are sooner or later faced by circumstances in which they have to make their first choice: to make or not to make a corrupt decision. Emergence of such circumstances depends on both the problems which were discussed above and conditions nurturing corruption and on social and psychological factors. Understanding the nature of the latter, it would be easier to determine what is to be done to crack down on corruption.

One of the most widespread explanations is psychological compensation for losses suffered by an official in relation to his service. Loss of morals may be caused by:

• feeling of instability which was discussed above;

• low salary not commensurate with the skills and the scope of responsibility of public servant;

• injustice in the promotion to higher posts;

• boorishness or incompetence of superiors.

These factors may be removed by the appropriate renovation of the system of civil service.

Experts stress that in transition periods a corrupt decision may be considered by an official as an act of sabotage against the new system. A corrupt official considers himself a champion of fighting against the "criminal regime" while actually he is nothing but an ordinary money-grabber.

Making first corrupt decision may be eased by the information medium wherein an official operates. An honest official hearing and reading from day to day "Everybody takes bribes in our country" begins to consider himself an outcast, a loser whom nobody even offers a bribe. Then he only has to wait for a convenient situation.

An important peculiarity of the social and psychological climate in society that nurtures flourishing corruption is the double moral standard. On the one hand, corruption, especially the top-level one, is considered as something socially unacceptable. Such position is supported by the day-to-day morale, by the press and political practice exploiting the anticorruption issues.

On the other hand, corruption, especially grassroots one, is considered "by default" as a routine element of the everyday life. Zones that are almost closed to the law-enforcement bodies fighting with corruption continue to exist. Accusations of corruption became so routine and widely used that the watershed between the norm and aberration gradually disappears.

An official may become a corrupt not only after making the watershed solution but as a result of a smooth transition from the "boundary" activities to criminal ones. This transition is eased by the absence of clear cut technologies of management, decision-making, when the scopes of rights and responsibilities are blurred. In the transitional periods smooth creeping into corruption is eased by following the obsolete but still active traditions and cultural stereotypes.

For instance, in the old system there existed a special kind of "securities": documents with a collection of visas, permissions and authorizations ranging from a village Soviet to the Politburo. They allowed informal conversion of power capital into an economic one. Such practice existed in all branches of power and at all levels. It is being erased now with great difficulties.

Similar effects are generated by the concurrent existence of the old and new stereotypes of the administrative behavior. The Soviet system allowed to legally convert power into personal comfort and, illegally, to personal capital. It forbade however, conversion in the opposite direction. There were exceptions, however, they were considered unacceptable and from time to time punished. One could gain shadowy influence but it was impossible to legally buy legal power for money .

A normal democracy allows conversion of economic power into state power (e.g. through the electoral mechanisms), however, in its developed forms it creates obstacles for the conversion of power capital into an economic one.

A specific feature of the transition period is the mixture of the traditions and cultural stereotypes, the freedom of virtually unhindered conversion of one form of capital into another. As a result public servants consider their posts a continuation of the market. Democracy is considered to be the freedom of conversion of the normal market into the market of corruption-based services.

An anticorruption policy is to become an integral part of the state policy. In practical terms it means that an anticorruption program is to be developed and launched without delay, moreover, it is to evolve into a permanently operating system of the corruption restrain. The development and the implementation of such a program are to be based on deep understanding of the corruption's nature, on an analysis of failures of the attempts to crack it down, on an awareness of existing prerequisites and limitations, on clear-cut and productive principles.

2.1.1. Current Failures and Success's

In the current legislation corruption-related actions may be qualified by the following articles of the criminal code: No. 174 - legalization of financial means and other property acquired illegally; No. 285 - misuse of the official authority. No. 290 - acceptation of a bribe; No. 291 - offer of a bribe; No. 292 - forgery of documents. At the same time a number of actions closely related to corruption was not included in the new criminal code. They are:

• participation of an official figure in a commercial activity for deriving personal benefits;

• using of an official position for "pumping" state resources into commercial structures for deriving personal benefits with the involvement to this end of other persons and relatives;

• granting privileges to commercial structures by an official figure for deriving personal benefits;

• granting state financial and other resources to electoral funds.

The Law "On Fighting With Corruption" adopted by the State Duma in November 1997 proved to be very feeble. Besides plenty of juridical inconsistencies and technical blunders it contains as new elements some additional limitations on the actions of official figures. It was not necessary to develop a new law which was a subject of fierce struggle for three years, amendments to the legislature on the state service would suffice. Adoption of the Law "On Fighting With Corruption" even after some juridical "trimming" may bring harm rather then benefits for a number of reasons. The most harmless of them is disillusionment of people because of disparity between the name of the law and its vanishing results. One can doubt in the necessity of such a law. Anticorruption measures should embrace all the legislature instead of being limited by a single law.

In 1992, the president of the Russian Federation issued a Decree "On Fighting With Corruption in the State Service System", Because of absence of mechanisms for its implementation it proved to be a most neglected one in the whole history of the Russian presidentship. Its norms obligating public servants to declare their income and property began implementing only five years after, after the issue of an additional decree in 1997. A norm forbidding public servants to participate in an entrepreneurial activity is not fulfilled up to now. According to the information of the Ministry of Internal Affairs more then 800 cases of such violation were revealed in the period from 1994 through mid 1997. A possibility to combine the state service with the commercial activity is apparently not only a huge loophole for corruption. It is also an incentive for the occupation of official posts exclusively with the purpose of the illegal enrichment.

The Federal law "About base of a state service in Russian Federation" providing some restrictive anticorrupt measures was badly carried out either. One of the reasons was the absence in the law of mechanisms and procedures of realization of the norms which where formulated in that law. This lack in Russian law-creation is rather widespread and permanently derivates new conditions that are favorable for corruption.

Measures were adopted at the institutional level aiming at the restrain of corruption in the law-enforcing bodies. Nowadays the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Customs Committee and the Federal Service of Tax Police have departments of internal security of their own. According to the information of the RF General prosecutor's office the service of internal security of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is the most effective one. It reveals 60% of crimes committed by official figures of the ministry. Besides, a Federal program of the crackdown on corruption in 1996-1997 was adopted. However its implementation was very slow and ineffective.

The state of affairs in fighting with corruption can be assessed by the dynamics of the number of convicts on corruption-related charges. Table I and 2 show corresponding numbers for the USSR and the Russian Federation respectively.

Table I. Number of convicted for bribery in the USSR (Figures are round up)

Table 2. Number of convicted for bribery in the Russian Federation

Note that the population of the Russian Federation is smaller then that of the USSR by 40%. At the same time the number of convicted for bribery decreased five times. There are no reasons to believe that it occurred due to the soaring of moral standards in the state bodies.

However this is not a single alarming issue. From the total number of convicted for bribery in 1994-1996 only 1169 (34%) were convicted to imprisonment. One can confront this figure to the data of the RF General prosecutor's office which during the same period of time revealed annually about 5 ,000 cases of bribery. Such comparison show that courts give verdict of guilty to not more then to every fifth defendant. The probability to get behind the bars after launching the case by the prosecutor's office does not exceed 0.08. At the same time the prosecutor's offices themselves complain that they receive the criminal cases from the Ministry of Internal Affairs with so many violations of the norms of the Civil criminal code that the positions of lawyers at courts prove to be basically 100% winning.

Low efficiency of the law-enforcing system becomes even more apparent if one consider results of its activity in the spheres which are the most strongly infected with corruption all countries. According to the information of the State Tax Service in 1995 criminal cases for bribery were launched against 97 officers of the service; only six of them were convicted. Criminal cases by the Article "Misuse of the Authority" were launched against 17 officers. No one was convicted! The situation was not much better in 1996-1997. At the same time the number of cases launched against officers of the service increases from year to year. Such a situation is specific not to the Tax Service alone.

Experts knowledgeable in the nature of corruption and, hence, in the methods of cracking it down are basically absent in the system of the law-enforcing bodies. The overwhelming majority of suggested measures are related with the counteraction to the corruption manifestations. It is testified by the (not implemented) Federal program on strengthening fight with corruption in 1996-1997 and the projects of next programs on cracking down corruption which are developed by the law-enforcing bodies and stipulating barren "measures on the strengthening of fight". The most dangerous feature of these plans is a wrong explanation of causes which create corruption.

Naive and absolutely unproductive vision of causes which create corruption has not changed. The vision of such causes under the Soviet power was exhibited at the beginning of the report. And this is a quotation from a preamble to a draft program of fighting with corruption dating 1996: "The current situation occurred because in the state authority bodies a work on the selection and placement of the personnel was loosened..."

One can state beyond any doubts that the law-enforcing bodies of the country fail to fight with corruption. This failure is explained by at least three reasons. First, measures of the criminal persecution alone are not able to shake positions of large-scale corruption. Fighting with corruption is not a criminal problem only, it is a system one (and it was discussed at length above). Second, the quality of the work of the law-enforcing bodies is low; they themselves are corroded by corruption, and the professional level of the officers en masse does not correspond to the comple'<jty of the problem. Third, the law-enforcing system alone cannot cope with the problem: it requires solution by the combined efforts of the state and the society.

The situation began somewhat to change in 1997. According to the goals determined in the address of the RF President transition to open tenders on state orders is implemented, the budget discipline is strengthened. New laws are adopted which are to narrow the base of corruption: the Law "On the Executive Issues", the Law "On Court Officials" ("pristavakh"), the Law On Privatization, the Law On Bankruptcy. The 1998 budget stipulates increase by 48% financial resources allotted to the judicial system.

These trends however are weak. Besides there is a danger that the first efforts will prove to be the last ones. One can observe delays with the implementation of the president's order concerning development of the concept of the administrative reform. The latter is to include a package of anticorruption norms. It was assumed that the concept would be published in last October. It has not been done yet.

2.1.2. Fighting With Corruption: Prerequisites and Limitations

To better understand and assess possibilities for fighting corruption in Russia it is necessary to analyze feasible participation in the solution of the problem of main agents: authority bodies, key elements of the civil society (entrepreneurs, mass media, public institutions) and the society as a whole. It is no wonder (and it will he shown below) that in a complicated situation which occurred in Russia all the "players" carry both positive and negative "charges" with respect to lighting with corruption.

1. Mass media on one hand long ago and very profoundly became a battlefield of clashes on the corruption issues. They fit well for the mass media and enjoy high demand of the audience. An exclusive monopoly of a group on commercial mass media does not exist. It implies that the issues of corruption are still in the agenda.

On the other hand the business elite became aware of the power of mass media and of the fact that a political profitability of large-scale investments may result in economic benefits. We witness as a result fighting between different clans for information channels (in a broad sense of the word). Absence of norms regulating judicial and economic relations between journalists and their "masters" creates wide-spread shadow and even corruption-based relations in this sphere. Private mass media are under the threat of degenerating from the powerful mouthpiece of the civil society into a tool for fighting between economic and bureaucratic clans.

2. Russian business is expedient to be considered as consisting of three unequal parts. Its first and minor sector includes major financial groups which had grown up on the budget funds and on the access to administrative resources. On one hand while these groups fiercely fight with each other and new groups emerge Russia is not under the threat of becoming an oligarchic state. Exchange by anticorruption blows became recently an important tool of the interclan struggle. Such scandals reveal real situation for the people and make them prepared to more serious stages of fighting with corruption. Moreover, fighting waged in this way induces fear of using at least the most impudent corruption-related actions. It helps the natural selection in the bureaucratic medium and the choice of way to achieve success in business. Besides, it supports (yet feeble) anticorruption efforts of the authorities.

On the other hand "playing with fire", which clans are involved in striking each other by compromising materials, may have completely unforeseeable consequences. Powerful (in Russian scale) financial empires may collapse, "boomerang effect" may emerge when those who were the first to take arms become victims, spectacular crashes of the bureaucratic carriers may occur. All of these processes are either going on already or are about to emerge. However in a relatively unstable political situation more grave consequences are conceivable: collapse of the government and withdrawal from the reform-oriented policy. Fear of such issues pushes different groups to the consolidation for the sake of survival. Such a consolidation may become an obstacle for crackdown on corruption.

The second sector of Russian business embraces representatives of the "second echelon" of business. They were not allowed (and often do not strive to - because of fear or fastidiousness) to get an access to the budget feeding trough. For that reason they are interested in fair rules of the economic game. Entrepreneurs which gained strength in the conditions of real competition are not interested in intermingling of the power and business which nurtures corruption.

At the same time this sector of the Russian business is ill-consolidated and has not developed permanent effective mechanisms for the protection of their interests. The authorities following the already formed tradition contact with the representatives of the first, not numerous pool of businessmen while basically ignoring much more numerous second group which could evolve in a reliable foothold for the anticorruption efforts.

Finally, the third group of the Russian businessmen often referred to as "small and medium business" which, by democratic standards, is a base for the middle class is literally ensnared by grassroots corruption. The latter not only binders the business activity but literally debase the whole social stratum. This becomes a source of the social tension in those groups which, as history shows, were the locomotive force of not only bourgeois revolutions but also of fascist coups.

3. The Russian society is strongly disillusioned by the authorities. This disillusionment is maintained by a stable stereotype of its deep corruptness. The Russian public opinion which is not protected by the entrenchment of the civil responsibility and adherence to the democratic principles is prone to the temptations of simple solutions. One of the most wide-spread myths is a "strong hand". For that reason it will be very hard to gain trust of the people and their support for the implementation of an anticorruption program.

At the same time a number of nongovernmental organizations emerged recently which were corroded by corruption to much lesser extent then other aspects of life. These institutions of the civil society may become strong supporters in the implementation of an anticorruption program.

4. The Russian authorities are themselves concerned by losing trust of the society. The necessity to maintain their existence through the elections makes the authorities (sometimes intentionally and sometimes spontaneously) to take measures for strengthening their legitimacy. Fighting with corruption is apparently one of the most effective tools for solving the problem. The anticorruption rhetoric is gladly used by representative of all parts of the political spectrum. However any measures aiming at constraining corruption prove to be either symbolic or fragmentary.

Launching and implementation of anticorruption measures are hindered by several obstacles:

• some high-rank figures may be accused in corruption;

• there is a large group of officials which are not in interested in changing the status quo;

• old stereotypes maintain and dominate in the power; they dictate straightforward approaches to the solution of corruption-related problems.

The political will which is necessary for overcoming these obstacles should not be less than that which was exhibited in the most dangerous stages of the preceding reforms.

Meanwhile a dangerous situations keeps existing when corruption while remaining in the agenda of the political life is used in the struggles between clans, however, real measures for fighting with it are not taken. There are three patterns of the development of such a situation. Below they are labeled by conventional geographical names. All three patterns correspond to the conditions of corruption evolving into a system phenomenon, i.e. in a inseparable part of the political structure and the social fabric.

Asian pattern: corruption is a familiar and socially acceptable cultural and economic phenomenon which is closely related with functioning of the state. In spite of the large-scale which corruption gained in the country this pattern does not loom over Russia for a number of reasons. One of them is that civil freedoms became in Russia an important factor of the public and political life.

African pattern: the power is bought "wholesale" by major economic clans which came to an agreement and ensure their existence by political means. Transition to this pattern is feasible under the following conditions:

• political power in the country remains unconsolidated;

• financial-bureaucratic groups under the pressure of the self-preservation instinct cease confrontation and come to an agreement;

• an oligarchic consensus emerges between consolidated financial-bureaucratic groups and some part of the political elite.

For the country it would imply shrinking of democracy and using of democratic procedures as a camouflage. The economy would drop to a primitive level satisfying only the very basic demands of the population to avoid social turmoil and to ensure sustainment of a minor oligarchic group.

Latin American pattern: connivance to corruption allows shadow and crime-infected sectors of the economy to gain power comparable to that of the state. The power gets involved for decades into a tough direct confrontation with the Mafia which evolves into a state within the state. Economic wealth on the background of other problems becomes not only unattainable but is pushed to the oblivion. The permanent political instability increases probability of establishing a dictatorship in the wake of fighting with corruption. Next the transition to the African pattern becomes probable.

The world history shows the hysterics of fighting with corruption cleans the way to dictators. Ironically the dictatorship after its entrenching gives boost for corruption which gains even larger scale and corrodes the power. Finally, societies in the transitional period from totalitarianism (or dictatorship which existed for a long time) to democracy bear a virus of totalitarian revanche under the slogan of fighting with negative aspects of democracy and, first of all, corruption.

There is only one alternative to this scenario: development and implementation of the state anticorruption program based on the consolidation of the major part of political forces and close interaction with the institutions of the civil society.

Russia apparently cannot be referred to any of the patterns listed above or to any combinations thereof. It implies that corruption in Russia has not become yet a system element. The chance is not missed yet.

2.1.3. The International Experience of the Struggle with Corruption

Transparency International in 1997 carried out the ranking of 52 countries on the Corruption Perception Index. This index is based on international surveys of business people, political analysts and the general public and it reflects their perception of corruption. In accordance with that ranking Russia is on 49th place (the ranking system is designed so that countries that are perceived to be the least corrupt are given the highest scores). It means that in comparison with 1996 the situation in our country has worsened. With the purpose of the reforming of such deplorable circumstances, it is useful to assess an experience of the countries of the three kinds: countries not overcomed corruption, countries that have been suffered from fearful corruption but contrived to lower it, and low corrupted countries undertaking serious efforts for such result.

China is one of the neighbours of Russia under the table mentioned above. China has the same difficulties of the transition period as has our country. It was announced repeatedly on party and state forums in China that corruption is a major national problem. Anticorruption campaigns basically reducing to the struggle against corruptionists were periodically began. As a result the corruption was hidden on the short term, but after that arose with the new strength.

The basic reason of the failures of the Chinese anticorruption campaigns is the strategy of reforming of economy and political system practising by the Chinese powers. The essence of that strategy consists of the gradual liberalization of the economy at preservation of the basis of the political system, extensive state control and political monopoly of CPC. In particular, the markets of ground and property are functioning under the rigid state and administrative control, the movement of the citizens is limited (especially to the free economic zones), the elements of the centralized distribution of resources are kept, the destiny of many enterprises, manufactures depends on the organizational decisions accepted by authorities. Thus, all described above negative effects of the transitional period that promoting nurturing of corruption are kept and aggravated.

China is a representative of the countries with transitional economy, where the strong centralized power is kept. However, this power is incapable to curb corruption for objective circumstances of the transitive period. One can expect that the chance of the actual restriction of corruption in China will appear only after serious reconstruction of the political system and change of the principles of the state presence in the economy.

By various expert estimations Nigeria is one of the most corrupted countries. Nigerian barons derived huge oil revenues in 1970s, but although that money could be used to benefit society there eventually were not. As its previously astronomical oil revenues fell in the late 1980s, Nigerian robber barons and their syndicates (criminal gangs) have sought new ways to make money and, as exiled Nigerian academic Julius Ihonvbere has pointed out, "the only ways were drug trafficking, currency trafficking etc".

Since 1994, the London-based Economist Intelligence Unit has rated Nigeria as one of the world's highest-risk business locations. Corruption continues to be endemic throughout Nigeria, with some economists suggesting it could constitute up to 10% of the country's GDP. At the grassroots level, officials and administrators ask for gifts of "dash" or "bread" for conducting even the most basic paperwork, although increasingly this is due to having to wait months to receive their already low salaries. Upon arrival in Nigeria, foreign business people are regularly asked by customs and immigration officials, particularly at Lagos, if the visitor has brought a "gift", especially American dollars. At the national and senior government levels, corrupt practices have almost become institutionalized, particularly with regard to contracts for "super- projects" and for the sale of import licences for scarce consumer goods. With contract tenders, a 10% to 15% "overpayment" in the tender offer is expected to be passed on to the government officials' overseas bank accounts. Another practice is the "sale" of import licences for the importation of goods, particularly scarce consumer goods such as medicines, rice, cooking oil and machinery parts.

The national economy continues to stagnate, thus internal stability of the country constantly undermines. Economy of other countries are also affected. All attempts to democratize Nigeria and reform its economics have failed.

The corruption combined to weakness of the state, neglecting by the state of its minimal obligations, is a serious problem for many other developing countries of Africa, Latin America, Asia. For each of these regions it is possible to show examples of the countries, where "vicious circle" of poverty, backwardness and corruption was formed.

At the same time there are the countries begun transformations and little by little went to the "a salutary cycle of reforms". In such countries corruption can be restricted.

Uganda was the cleptocratic state in its first postcolonial period. Regime has controlled the country until 1967 and has created backgrounds for rise to power of the Idi Amin by 1971. With this leader the government practically has turned to system of the organized crime, which made profit at the expense of the population. Support of the economically unprofitable projects, excessive military charges, bribes for the state contracts, extortionate control over export, expropriation of the property prospered.

During the civil war in 1986 under a management of Yovery Muzevyny the new government begun the transformation was created. The reforms of socio-economic politics were undertaken, the volume and the ways of the state regulation of the economy were varied for shrinking of the basis of corruption. The state bodies were reformed with the purpose of simplification of bureaucratic procedures; the political machine was reduced, payment for the work of the officials and their professional training were improved; the rigid ethical code was created. Besides, the General Inspector Service authorized to carry out investigations, to accuse and to commit for trial was consolidated. The organization of the campaign on public relations for consolidation of the public efforts directed on the struggle with corruption has played a considerable role.

The Independent commission on the struggle with corruption working in Hongkong (China since July 1, 1997) is one of the examples of the bodies successfully realizing resolute measures against deeply entranched corruption. The careful monitoring over the authorities actions - both from the side of the official institutes and the detached citizens, - and proceedings are the basis for the anticorruption struggle.

However the Commission has some problems. Chief problem consists in that Commission is under the supervision of the governor only. However, the Commission on the struggle with corruption supervised by the sole governor can be used as the tool of reprisal against the political opponents; such accusations were made towards Commission. It was checked by some supervision commissions and independent judicial instances, but nevertheless it couldn’t miss scandals. In order that the similar organization has not got out of control, it should be supervised not by the head of executive, but by such legislative body as the General Inspector Service in Uganda and the Central financial-control management in United States. The strong independent organization on the struggle with corruption is a powerful weapon having trust and aimed at the prospects. But it is necessary to do the best for that such organization not become the tool of tendentious use in political ends.

The agency (commission) on the struggle with corruption in Singapore submitted to the prime minister Li Kuan Yu, thus having significant political and functional independence.

One of the key measures of the anticorruption program in Singapore was essential increase of wages of the civil servants. Reporting in 1985 before parliament about correctness of charges of the political machine, the prime minister said, "I am the one of the most well-paid and, probably, one of the poorest prime ministers of the countries of the third world … There are various ways of decisions. I offer our way within the framework of the market economy, which is honour, open, money's-worth and feasible. If you will prefer hypocricy to it, you will confront with double game and corruption. Make your choice ".

Since July, 1973 special anticorruption program was launched in the Ministry of the finance of Singapore. This program included, in particular, following measures:

• perfection of the procedures of interaction with the citizens and organizations with the purpose of elimination of delays;
• introduction of the transparency of the control over grassroots officials by the higher officials;
• introduction of rotation over officials for avoidance of the formation of the steady corruptive connections;
• implementation of the unforesee checks;
• maintenance of the confidential regime for prevention of leakage of the important information, which can be used in corruptive purposes;
• introduction of procedure of a revision of the complex anticorruption measures every 3-5 years.

When launching anticorruption program in early 1970s, Singapore has achieved impressing successes in the struggle with corruption. Now it occupies the ninth place in the TI ranking (It means that there are only eight less corrupted countries).

As a result of serious purposeful efforts the positive shifts are revealed in Peru. Peru in 1990 began a major crackdown on corruption and inefficiency in its customs service. By 1995 it had boosted revenue from $625 million to $2.6 billion a year and reduced the average time for a shipment to clear customs from five days to two hours.

"Seventy percent of Peruvian customs workers are professionally trained, up from 2 percent in 1990, and any evidence of corruption is grounds for immediate firing", said James Shaver, general secretary of the World Customs Organization.

Many countries are rather clear from corruption: they are among the first ten or twenty countries on the TI ranking. Apparently, they could create the effective mechanism of the struggle with corruption. Among that countries there are the follows ones (seriated on increase of the rating): Denmark, Finland, Sweden New Zealand, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Australia, Singapore, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Ireland, Germany, Great Britain, Israel, USA, Austria.

Let's consider some features of the arrangement of an anticorruption activity in such countries. The corruption, first, is realized by government of these countries as a serious problem of national security. Thus the corruption is considered as external and internal threat. Two aspects of corruption are precisely divided: political and economic. The development of the political corruption can result to unregulable political situation in the country and represents threat to democratic institutes and balance of various branches of authority. The economic corruption reduces efficiency of market institutes and regulating activity of the state. It is important to note, that the efforts on the restriction of a corruption in these countries, as a rule, are institutionalized, and they impress with their scale.

The system of the struggle with corruption in the Netherlands includes the following procedural and institutional measures:

1. The permanent accountability and publicity in the questions of a detection of the corruption and discussion of its consequences, i.e. punishments for corrupt actions. Annually Secretary of State for Home Affairs (министр внутренних дел) of this country represents the report to parliament about discovered facts of corruption and accepted measures on punishment of the persons involved in corruption.

2. Development of the system of monitoring over the points of possible occurrence of corrupt actions in the state and public organizations and the system of the strict control over the activity of the persons working in these points.

3. Introducing the system of the officials’ rights and obligations with the denotement of their responsibility for infringement of official ethics, including corruption. This system specifies also the rules of behaviour on correction of the infringements done.

4. The basic measure of punishment for corrupt action is prohibition to work in the state organizations and loss of all social privileges, which are given by a state service, for example of pension and social service. The scale of punishments includes also penalties and temporary dismissal.

5. In all significant organizations, in particular, in the ministries, there are services of internal security, which obligation is to register and reveal the officials’ mistakes, their intended or casual infringements of working rules, and appropriate consequences of such infringements. The state organizations aspire to encourage positive actions of the officials. The system of encouragements is directed to generate such situation, when an official gains from the honest and effective behaviour as in the material such as in the moral plans.

6. The system of selection of the persons on posts dangerous for their corrupt opportunities is organized.

7. All materials concerning corrupt actions, if they do not affect the system of national security, in the obligatory order become accessible to a public.

8. Each official has the right to become acquainted with the information describing him (her) as in positive so as in negative aspects.

9. The special system of training of the officials that explaining, in particular, political and public harm from the corruption, and possible consequences of a participation in it is created.

10. The system of the state security on the struggle with corruption (such as special police) having significant powers on revealing of cases of corruption is created.

11. The officials at all levels are obliged to register cases of corruption, that are known for them. This information is transferred to the Ministries of Home Affair and Justice on the appropriate channels.

12. Mass media play the large role in the struggle with corruption. It make public the cases of corruption and frequently carry out their independent investigations. At the same time slanderous messages result to deprivation of public trust and reputation of the appropriate sources of the information. Substantially, irresponsibility in preparation of accusatory materials is thus prevented.

Israel is one of the countries which are rather free from corruption. It is provided, alongside with the measures similar that of Netherlands, by the system of the certain duplication of monitoring over probable corrupt actions. It is carried out by governmental organizations and special departments of police, department of the State controller having independence of the ministries and state departments, and public organizations such as Department for cleanliness of government. These organizations investigate probable corrupt points, and in the case of their detection inform investigation bodies. The information received should in the obligatory order be publicized. The independence of these organizations from the management of the ministries and departments, whose officials can be involved in corruption, is very important. Management on the struggle with corruption which is included in Administration of the prime minister, is obligated for training the officials permanently to prevent possible corrupt actions and for coordinating the work of various in-house services on the struggle for cleanliness of state bodies.

Mass media also play the important role. According to the statement of the one of the largest political figures of this country, "accusation in corruption, which can appear in reputable newspaper, are the most dangerous to his political career".

Regard must be paid to the fact, that in Israel, by reason of significant social privileges for the officials and their ruthless punishment at detection of corruption, the grassroot corruption practically is absent.

2.1.4. Principles of the Anticorruption Struggle

When planning an anticorruption program one should base on the following prerequisites:

1. Absolute victory over corruption is impossible. Moreover, when the power and the society are in normal conditions corruption is a useful technological signal indicating malfunction of the power.

2. There are no countries doomed apriori on large-scale and long-term corruption. Russia is not an exception from the rule.

3. Restraining corruption cannot be limited to a one-time campaign. The end of any campaign may be followed by a new, even more scaring burst of corruption.

4. Corruption cannot be restrained by legislative measures and by fighting with its manifestations only. Moreover, in the conditions when corruption gained large scale and attained high level of the power fighting with its causes is more effective than a unprepared attack on its manifestations.

5. Fighting with corruption may be successful if it is comprehensive, complex, it is waged on a permanent basis and combines all the forces of the power and the society.

6. Anticorruption program is to be materialized at the highest levels of the political leadership of the country and in a maximum close cooperation with he institutions of the civil society.

7. Losses inflicted to the state and to the society by corruption are so large that any reasonable expenses on the realization of an anticorruption program will return very rapidly and the return will exceed expenditures in tens of times.

Analysis given above shows that the anticorruption policy should include measures aiming at the solution of the following problems:

• organization of fighting with corruption at all levels;

• narrowing of conditions and circumstances nurturing corruption;

• decrease of benefits derived from corruption-based deals for both sides involved in corruption;

• increase of the probability of exposing corruption activities and punishment for inflicted losses;

• affecting corruption-motivated behavior;

• creating an atmosphere of the public unacceptability of corruption in all its manifestations.

The main cause of the corruption expansion in the transitional period is a disparity between new conditions wherein the state mechanism is to function and the obsolete mechanisms of its functioning. It implies that the main efforts of the anticorruption program should be channeled to the organization of smooth functioning of the state mechanism in the new conditions. Concurrently a system renovation is to be carried on which would affect basic concepts, values and behavior stereotypes of public servants and other people.

Since corruption is a consequence of the general problems of the country and the society fighting with it cannot be reduced to an implementation of a narrow-scale anticorruption program but instead should embrace all the renovation programs. In these cases the anticorruption program serves also as an additional justification for the implementation of corresponding measures in the related programs. Besides, it implies necessary coordination which would allow to avoid doubling and, instead, to combine efforts.

The analysis given in the first part of the report had to persuade the reader that improving the mechanisms and reasonable restraining of the state interference in the economy will narrow the basis nurturing corruption. The same effect is expected from straightening things out in the sphere of the state finances. These conclusions are illustrated below by some examples.

1. The transition to a realistic and realizable budget will remove situation of the deficit of the budget funds which broadens the sphere of "personal factor" in making decisions by the officials (who will obtain resources and how much less than it was stipulated, who will obtain resources earlier and who will do it later).

2. Ensuring materialization of the rights of counteragents, of the property owners and shareholders, making activities of enterprises "transparent" for shareholders (and other similar measures) will allow entrepreneurs to appeal the law and will decrease the necessity to resort to bribing officials as a tool for the protection of their commercial interests.

3. Improvement of the tax legislation will decrease the shadow (and hence the most strongly corruption-infected) sector of the economy, will limit the possibilities for blackmailing entrepreneurs by the officials of the tax collecting bodies.

4. Decrease of the cash flow, more broad use of modern electronic ways of pay men is. introduction of the modern forms of financial reporting will ease the control over the money flows and will hinder bribing in cash. This is the most important for restraining grassroots corruption.

1. Commercializing of some social services (including housing and communal service) and introduction of the competition in this sphere will transform a corrupted market of deficit services in a normal market of services.

2. More broad use of the modern methods of social payments in the electronic form will diminish dependence of applicants on the will of the officials and, in this way, will restrain grassroots corruption.

3. Delegating some social issues to the institutions of the civil society (under the slate control over the expenditure of resources) is one of the most effective ways for counteracting grassroots corruption. Public organizations obtaining through tender and on the contract base the rights on the implementation of some state functions are more open to the public control and are less bureaucratized. Besides, they are actually designated for the solution of the main problem and not for the consolidation of the institution itself as it is specific for bureaucratic systems. In this way three important problems are solved concurrently: grassroots corruption is restrained, efficiency of the realization of the state social functions increases, trust of the society to the power is consolidated.

This is one of the key problems related to the realization of the anticorruption program. Its importance does not need any justification. It is necessary:

• to guarantee decent sustainment for judges and the judicial system as a whole;

• to improve the system of training and selecting the personnel;

• to consolidate arbitrage courts, to make their work more reliable;

• to develop an administrative judicial system.

Concurrently it is necessary to narrow opportunities for the infiltration of corruption in the corps of judges (this problem is discussed in more detail below).

Grassroots corruption can be strongly restrained by introducing a real dependence of systems serving the population upon the population itself. It can be achieved by means of establishing an efficient local self-government. Experience shows that e.g. a local highway militia supervised by the elected bodies of the local self-government is much less corrupted than its counterpart which is in charge of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

However the local self-government is to be developed concurrently with the crackdown on corruption and on the organized crime. Otherwise the local self-government will get under the control of criminal elements.

The Federal Assembly is the most independent body in our country. Currently the Constitution restricts its supervising functions. They may be introduced, however, in a legislative way. One condition should be strictly satisfied: supervising functions may be implemented only under the strict procedural limitations. Otherwise these functions themselves may become a source of corruption.

The Audit Chamber is in a sense a unique body in the system of power institutions of Russia. It is basically independent from the President and the executive power since it has a source of independent financing. This body can by considered as second most independent from the executive power body. Already now its activity brings the state treasury 20 times more than the expenditures on its financing (accounting only "direct" benefits).

Unfortunately the potential of the Audit Chamber is not completely actualized by the system of the state control yet. One of the reasons is the absence of strict mechanisms of applying sanctions based on the conclusions of the Audit Chamber. Besides, the chamber is understaffed; it employs 700 people only. For comparison, the staff of similar bodies in the USA and Poland makes 3,500 and 1,500 people respectively.

It is expedient to broaden the powers of the Audit Chamber. In particular, a post of a special controller can be introduced. The controller will be in charge of the distribution of state orders, their distribution on the basis offenders (when it is possible) and their compliance to norms and standards (when a tender is impossible).

Because of political battles in the State Duma the institute of the Commissioner on the human rights has not been operating for already four years. It can be used, however, for restraining corruption. An apparent example referring to the Commissioner's authority: guaranteeing of the citizens' access to the information concerning activity of the state bodies.

1. Informing population about plans, decisions and actions of the authorities. It will result in establishing public control over the authorities. A possibility to obtain information is to be guaranteed on the legal level (the authorities are to be obliged to provide the required information), strict sanctions are to be introduced for the violations of these obligations.

3. Introduction of [he personal responsibility of the officials for the management of resources and properly. In Russia in contrast to the majority of other countries the bulk of decisions concerning resources and property are made collectively: by the government and numerous committees. Collective irresponsibility is a perfect camouflage for corruption.

4. Introduction of open tenders on the state orders and bulk purchases. When such tenders are impossible strict specifications and standards on the products and services are to be introduced.

5. Weakening of a monopoly and creating competition in the sphere of rendering stale services. The market of corruption-based services operates according to the laws of the "deficit economy". For that reason an access of citizens to the state services should be eased.

6. Abolition of off-budget funds for financing officials. Low budget financing of the bodies of the executive power forces them to create off-budget funds. They are nourished by royalties related, as a rule, with performing of their mainstream functions: payments, fines, etc. Off-budget funds are under less strict control thus nurturing corruption.

1. Considerable increase of the salaries of public servants (which is the most important for the officials of the low- and intermediate level). A natural inferiority complex is to be overcome: "How one can increase salaries when the situation in the country is this bad!". In Singapore, where an anticorruption program was successfully implemented, gradual increase of salaries began long before the economic prosperity of the country and in the conditions of flourishing corruption,

Concurrently with the increase of salaries and introduction of a strong system of social guarantees one should abolish the obsolete system of service privileges concerning the everyday life of the officials.

2. Adjustment of the mechanisms of the promotion with the separation between the legal status of professional officials and that of "political nominees". Establishing quotas for the heads of the executive bodies on promoting their "political nominees" will bring a positive effect. Presence in boss' surrounding of the professional public servants which are less dependent upon the will of the boss narrows the opportunities for his corruption-based behavior.

3. Adoption of the Ethic Code of the Public Servant will create an atmosphere of morality in the state service which will diminish probability of the corruption-related activities.

• separation of the spheres of competence of officials and protection of their competence;

• shrinking the sphere of "personal will";

• establishment of the strict rules regulating contacts between citizens and officials which would stipulate that citizens are always and completely informed about their rights and official's obligations;

• introduction in some important cases the measures of criminal responsibility for the officials who defected the law (not only at presence of proved malicious intention);

• more strict control over the state officials and more severe responsibility for deviating from the norm of behavior prescribed by the law.

5. Increase of the prestige of the state service. One should get rid of the harmful myth "Everybody steals" which creates an additional favorable background for the expansion of corruption. Mass media should help people to distinguish "grains from weeds". It would be expedient to introduce professional contests on the grassroots level and corporate awards for honesty and high professional skills on the middle and top levels of the bureaucratic machine. Here combined efforts of the state and of the NGO's may be useful.

Corruption may be defeated only with the involvement of the institutes of the civil society since the latter is the most interested in such a victory. It is even more urgent in the conditions of the deep alienation of the power from the society. The state drawing public organizations to the full-fledged cooperation in the solution of the corruption problems gets a chance to gain trust of the citizens and, hence, a chance for achieving the established goals.

Grassroots corruption cannot be restrained without involvement of the people since corruption entrenched at the low levels of the authority is almost insensible to the authoritative pulses going downwards from the top. However corruption can be hold back by the pressure from below, by the combined efforts of the citizens and the institutions of the civil society.

That's why the authorities when implementing the anticorruption program should actively involve the public and, first of all, the entrepreneurs and the independent mass media. Special attention should be paid to forming the law-based and civil conscience and to training basics of behavior in the democratic and law-based society, in particular, basics of the anticorruption behavior.

2.2.2. Institutional Measures

An executive body implementing the anticorruption program must be a permanent Anticorruption agency. As it was done in the implementation of virtually ail serious anticorruption programs it is expedient to ensure the maximum independence of the Agency. It will be possible if its establishment and activity are regulated by the law, and the head of the Agency is endorsed by the Parliament on the proposal of the President.

The goals of the Agency can be formulated as follows:

• development of specific projects in the framework of the anticorruption program;

• representation in authority bodies implementing internal anticorruption programs (see the section "Departmental anticorruption programs" below);

• collection and analysis of data on corruption in the country, contemplation of authorities’ activity and administrative procedures for checking if they produce a nourishing medium for corruption;

• examination of the normative acts on their favoring of corruption;

• acceptance and consideration of the complaints concerning putative corrupt actions, consultation of the citizens and organizations on methods of counteraction and restriction of corruption;

• participation in the work of special groups investigating major cases of corruption,

• establishment of the service for the legal protection for the victims of corruption including permanently operating "hot lines";

• informing society about the implementation of the anticorruption program;

• establishing the interaction with the institutions of the civil society in the issues of fighting with corruption.

It is important that the methods of work of such governmental body were the pattern of the features which are to be introduced as a result of the anticorruption program implementation; transparency, competitiveness, high administrative and professional level, utilization of anticorruption mechanisms, etc.

Effective involvement of the public in fighting with corruption can be ensured by the establishment of a Public council on fighting with corruption which would unite representatives of major public organizations which take part in the anticorruption activities. The functions of the body may be as follows:

• development of a united policy of public organizations;

• coordination of the actions of public organizations;

• development and implementation of anticorruption agreements between the corporate associations and authorities;

• work with the population in the framework of the anticorruption program.

It should be stressed that the establishment of such a body is not a fashion but one of the necessary conditions for the successful implementation of the anticorruption program.

2.2.3. Direct Anticorruption Measures

Below are listed the concrete measures for liquidation of obvious corrupt-promoting lacks of functioning of power bodies. These measures should be carried out concurrently with realization of general measures. Only then it is possible to hope, that the nature of the changes will not carry just futile character.

Goal No. I is to diminish the influence of corruption on the electoral process. Fighting for clear and transparent electoral process and, first of all, financing of the electoral campaigns is absolutely pragmatic. It aims at preventing a possibility to blackmail political figures after their election and at protecting in this way the society from the corruption-based decisions which could be made by such politicians counter to the interests of the country and its citizens.

To this end the current electoral legislation and practice should be revised to provide possible solution to the following problems:

• strengthening of the state and public control over the electoral procedures;

• increase of the allowed size of the electoral funds which is to correspond to the real expenditures on carrying on the electoral campaigns;

• strengthening control over the fulfillment of the regulations concerning financing of the electoral campaigns; punishment for violations of the regulations should not be less than those for the violations of the traditional economic "rules of the game";

• increasing the role and independence of the electoral committees making them concurrently more transparent for the public control.

Goal No. 2 is to diminish the influence of corruption on the activity of the legislative bodies. To this end the procedure for launching a criminal case against deputies should be simplified. The control over the procedures of the legislature is to be strengthened. More strict public control over the activity of legislative bodies is also of importance.

Corruption in the legislative bodies is often used for filling party coffers. For that reason on later stages it will be expedient to introduce a generally accepted practice of financing parliamentary parties from the state budget. It is to be done concurrently with strengthening of the state control over the activity of the parties in the framework of the Constitution and the laws. The ways and the sources of financing for political organizations and political actions are to be absolutely transparent for the society.

Establishment of the parties which would bear responsibility with respect to their voters, be transparent for them, possess mechanisms of promoting its nominees into politics and bearing responsibility for them is to be encouraged. This requires in the framework of the current Constitution the renovation of the electoral system. Elections by party lists are specific for a parliamentary republic. Elections by party lists in absence of the mandate on the formation of the government for the winning party (or the coalition) corrupts parties by mimicking the political struggle.

Corruptness of the law-enforcing bodies and the low professional level of the personnel fighting with corruption are the main obstacles for the implementation of the anticorruption program. That's why one of the most urgent problems is the improvement of their work and cleansing from traitors. When solving these problems it is necessary:

• to increase the salary of, first of all, officers of the law-enforcement bodies. Afterwards their salaries should exceed salaries of the employees of the "civil services". Personnel of the tax collecting service and customs should be naturally included in that category;

• increase of the technical level of the law-enforcing bodies, introduction of the state-of-the-art information technologies;

• cleansing of the staff of the law-enforcing bodies, recruitment of the officers dismissed from the army in the framework of its reduction. A network of training courses should be established for preparing military servicemen to their work in the renovated law-enforcement bodies;

• establishment under the aegis of the RF General prosecutor's office of an interdepartmental research and training center. It has to analyze and generalize the experience of the law-enforcing bodies collected in fighting with corruption and to train personnel dealing with this problem in various agencies (including internal security services);

• creation and publication of new specialized and educational literature on the issues of fighting with corruption designated for the juridical departments and institutes;

• arrangement of training of Russian experts in the countries were anticorruption programs were successfully implemented.

Anticorruption powers of the courts are utilized extremely poor. It refers first of all to the civil courts. Their specific features make them a more effective tool in fighting with corruption than the criminal courts. A practice should be encouraged of litigation by the state of the officials caught out with bribing and by the companies against their competitors if the latter inflicted losses to the claimants by their corruption-related activities. Amendments to the Civil Code may possibly be necessary.

The main task is to increase the risk of large financial losses for the both sides of the corruption-based deal. It can be achieved by using discontent of those who suffered from the corruption-related activities. They can become effective allies in the implementation of the anticorruption program. This group of anticorruption fighters may include companies which bore losses, representatives of the authorities, people who were forced to offer a bribe. It can also include non-profit organizations as far as those share the concept that any corruption-based deal brings losses to the fabric of society.

Every agency has its own specific features, its own structure of corruption-related crimes and methods of their committing. A specific program is to be developed for every agency with the assistance of external experts.

Departmental anticorruption programs may include packages of measures which are developed according to the aims and specific features of agencies. The list of such measures, in particular, may include:

• introducing the practice of the regular transfer of the officials on a new post within the agency or to a similar post in another agency (expenditures on training will anyway be smaller than the corruption-related losses);

• more effective control of the officials by their supervisors by means of introducing a randomized schemes of the control. Accent should be made on the control of the correspondence of the activity of a subordinate to the established goals instead of the formal control over the fulfillment of the tasks;

• more strict control and responsibility for delays in the work with the citizens;

• alleviating of the deficit of the access to the state services;

• introduction of a special regime of work for offices contacting with the population (informing applicants about their rights, about obligations of the officials, introduction of technologies speeding up the work of the officials).

One of the major tasks in the development and implementation of the departmental anticorruption programs is to develop measures preventing "vertical" corruption (a system of unlawful payments of the officials to their bosses).

Regular renovation of the departmental anticorruption programs (every three to five years) is to be introduced.

Here one should mention also revision of the corruption-infected state economic and social programs. Some of them should be abolished, others revised and mechanisms of their implementation changed. Concurrently new procedures of the development, endorsement and implementation of the state programs are to be introduced. These new procedures should incorporate anticorruption principles and mechanisms.

It seems to be senseless to introduce legal concept of corruption alongside with its specific manifestations (e.g. a bribe). Any attempt to place this concept into strict limits would fail since some corruption-related activities will fall beyond the scope of the Criminal code and laws. For the same reason it would not be expedient to regulate fighting with corruption by the law on corruption only. It would be more effective to solve the problem in a system way envisaging means of anticorruption fight in the overall complex of legislative acts.

It implies that the implementation of the anticorruption program in all aspects listed above is to be supported by the development and adoption of a number of legislative acts embracing various spheres of the legislative regulation. The latter can include:

• law on lobbyism;

• law on the responsibility for the legalization of unlawful revenues;

• law on the confiscation of property and revenues acquired as a result of illegal deals (there is an experience of using such a law in Italy);

• law on the state control over the correspondence of major expenditures on the personal items to the declared income;

• law on the declaration of income and property by the top-level officials and public servants. The law aims at embracing by this mechanism judges and elected members of the legislatures of different levels alongside with the officials;

• amendments to the basic legislation on the state service. Provisions should be made to limit possibilities for a official leaving the state service to be employed by a commercial company which was in his charge or under his control. Similar limitation should be introduced for the elects to the legislative bodies;

• amendments to the current legislation which will declare illegal deals, agreements, licenses and permissions obtained from the state if it is found that they were received by means of corruption-related activities;

• electoral legislation (see corresponding section above);

• development of the administrative legislation.

A special aspect of the legislative work is related to the revision of the current legislation which is to be carried on in the following directions:

• disentangling of the controversies and clearing-up of ambiguous formulations in the current legislation, since they create opportunities for the officials' arbitrariness and corruption;

• "closing" of numerous interreferences in the current laws;

• revision of the scale of punishments for the corruption-related activities. It should be taken into account that excessive punishments often hinder proving the crimes;

• differentiation of the corruption-related actions in the Criminal code;

• revision of the scale of fees, fines, etc. (excessive fines are as ineffective as the low ones since they encourage circumventing them by means of bribes),

• more strict control over adopting departmental regulation norms.

The package of measures is to be implemented:

• dissemination of the information on the successful implementation of the anticorruption programs in other countries;

• fighting in the mass media with the myth that Russia is doomed to corruption;

• encouraging activities of the public organizations which watch cases, practice and methodology of corruption in Russia and disseminate the collected information;

• development and permanent utilization in the mass media of the corruptness indices allowing to compare with each other regions, branches of industry, major enterprises, decisions made by the branches of power and activities of their representatives;

• development of the system of the "local glasnost" designated for the informing of the society about the activities of the most "prominent" representatives of grassroots corruption (mainly by the efforts of public organizations);

• permanent informing of the society about the implementation of the anticorruption program (publication of bulletins, information pamphlets, etc.).

Important role in fighting with corruption belongs to the mass media. Their task is not only to inform the society about concrete cases of corruption but also to promote the anticorruption program, to announce its achievements, to train the audience to the basics of the anticorruption behavior, to form new norms of the public morale. At the same time the mass media are to be supported by the legislative protection. It may prove expedient to revise some current legislative norm, in particular, those concerning the source of the information (or to narrow the domain of its applicability).

The situation when the state-owned mass media depend exclusively upon the executive branch of power (which is apparently not the single state-power body) is to be altered. In the current conditions it is unrealistic to speak about glasnost in fighting with corruption. A parity-based control over the state-owned mass media with the participation of the Federal Assembly is to be introduced.

If domestic corruption is a manifestation of more general problems of a specific country, corruption created by the international activity is related to the imperfection of that activity. It implies that efforts are to be made to improve mechanisms of the international interaction. The work can be done in the following directions.

1. Judicial measures stipulate:

• bringing closer basic legislative of different countries concerning presence of the state in the economics;

• accession to the international agreements on the help on extradition of the criminals;

• making agreement with partner countries in economic relations on the repudiation of corruption as a tool of competition up to inclusion of corresponding principles into the legislation;

• introduction of internationally accepted standards of accounting;

• introduction of discriminatory measures with respect to businessmen originating from the countries whose legislation does not hinder using of bribery.

2. Police measure can include:

• establishing of the international information exchange (in particular, about companies practicing bribery);

• unification of basic concepts concerning proofs in the corruption-related cases (which is necessary e.g. for the justification of the appeals on the extradition of persons under criminal persecution);

• making bi- and multilateral agreements about joint operations;

• making agreements on the mutual aid: extradition of the persons under criminal persecution, interrogation of witnesses, access to bank accounts and their arrest.

The main task is to increase considerably the risk related to the transfer of illegal capitals and to moving their owners to foreign countries.

3. Partner aid:

• training of the personnel fighting with corruption;

• aid in the development of the anticorruption programs;

• aid in the development and implementation of propaganda programs.

One should be aware that at the first stages of implementation of the anticorruption program the figures characterizing the level of corruptness in the country will soar. It is inevitable for two reasons: introduction of a more accurate system of the account and overcoming the anemia of the law-enforcing system.

It is natural to expect that realization of the anticorruption program may face the resistance on different levels of the administrative hierarchy.

One cannot console himself by the observation that global transition processes are always accompanied by the burst of corruption. There are countries which endured the burst of corruption at the stage of renovation but managed to defeat it by the combined efforts. There are however other examples: the countries where reforms created an expansion of corruption and the absence of a coherent and comprehensive program of crackdown on it resulted in the entrenchment of corruption.

We have to make our choice. We understand clearly what we depart from. However, where we shall come depends on our combined efforts in fighting with corruption.

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