Discrimination of ethnic minorities at labor and housing markets
Phobias, prejudices and superstitions are opinions and psychological patterns a receiving community manifests towards migrants while discrimination is the actual behavior towards migrants.
In the first place, the most deprived representatives of ethnic minorities are subject to discrimination: lack of citizenship, registration, poor command of Russian, insufficient competency and vacancies in knowledge make them non-competitive in all spheres of social and economic life of the recipient society. Against this background a level of tolerance towards a specific minority is important: rejection of minority provokes discrimination of the minority members.
Mutual relationships of the local populace and various ethnic minorities are defined by mutual notions of the ‘ethnic hierarchy’ or ‘ethnic status’ though term ‘ethno-social status’ is perhaps more appropriate and exact in this case. It should be noted that ethnic stratification includes not only ethnic hierarchy but also ways of inequality reproduction, transfer of the inequality from a generation to next generation (i.e. inheriting of inequality) and perception of relevant ethnic differences by the recipient community as well as social valuation of ethnic differences by the recipient community.
An individual’s social status turns to be derived from status a minority occupies in the system of ‘local populace/minority’ relationship and relations among members of various minorities.
A discriminator takes into account not personal qualities of a laborer but status of a laborer’s minority which defines cost of a particular minority’s members at labor market. Social practices of relationships of the recipient community and ethnic minorities are predetermined by the past of a particular ethnic group formation and a degree of this group integration as perceived by local population. Surveys performed in Volga river region indicate that the local populations as well as experts distinguish quite definitely ethnic groups that are traditional for a particular country and migrant groups. The traditional ethnic groups are perceived as integrated in the local community at the individual and the collective levels. Experts do not think that it is possible to speak either of intolerance or discrimination in respect of such groups. According to an expert from Samara, ‘the Tatars, the Mordovians, the Chuvash people are insiders; in this respect they are as Russians’. Similar notions are expressed in respect of Jews and Germans (Samara, 2002; Samara, 2004; Astrakhan, 2004)
‘If one takes indigenous, native inhabitants (the Mordovians, the Chuvash people) then it should be said that really we are not alien to each other. Armenians, Georgians, a part of Azerbaijanis that live here for a long time are close to us. At the same time new comers from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, even if they are Russians are considered by the local people as aliens’. ‘Tatars, Chuvash people, Mordovians, Jews, people from Dagestan who live here for a long time are referred to as Russian (unless there are visible physical difference in their appearance’. (Samara, 2004).
Migrants from other ethnic groups are subject to discrimination in the sphere of social, cultural, economic rights. However prevailing discriminatory practices in the sphere of employment and housing renting are the most painful for migrants.
Discrimination of minorities’ members at labor market
At the labor market discrimination manifests itself in restriction of access to certain types of jobs and spheres of employment, in remuneration of labor, in working conditions.
Discrimination at labor market cannot be explained by any single factor. It is a derivative of several factors. Lack of legal grounds for work and for residence/staying at a region’s territory and labor permit for citizens of other CIS countries automatically closes access to employment in the budget sphere, to jobs in private sectors connected with material liability and/or administrative responsibility: “One has to know where to look for a person who is employed as a school watchman and how to find him’ (Astrakhan, 2004); ‘Who will employ a person with no registration and no citizenship to work in a school, in kindergarten, in housing and utilities maintenance, in organizations that have turnovers, where liability does exist? These organizations are subject to permanent examination’ (Samara, 2004).
Migrants seek to legalize themselves by every possible ways but due to complexity of procedures a relatively simple way is to get registration of stay. It is much more difficult to obtain a labor permit. It should be emphasized that the legal status is acquired through availability of both permits. Lack of either registration to stay or labor permit makes a temporary migrant an illegal migrant. (One more way to legalize, i.e. acquisition of the Russian citizenship is now actually unavailable for migrants). Legalization of status is connected with certain transaction costs that are relatively acceptable for getting registration of staying/residence and actually insurmountable for getting a labor permit.
Such objective factors as insufficient level of education, skill or command of Russian language play some role. On the other hand, authorities and local self-government bodies demonstrate certain bias against members of some minorities.
A responsible representative of Internal Affairs regional department stated: ‘There is no chance for Gypsies at the civil service’; ‘Not every Kazakh is able to write in Russian well’ (Astrakhan, 2004).
Situation in enterprises and organizations of the budgetary spheres where requirements to applicants are not so harsh is a bit better. Medicine, education, housing and utilities maintenance service, social work etc. belong to this group. However even in this sphere migrants confront difficulties. According to prevailing opinion, discrimination in private sector is less spread than in budgetary organizations. Due to tightening of order in state organizations members of minorities are pushed into private business and twilight economy. ‘Small business…People who are discriminated in other spheres go to small business. They have no other way’. ‘People are not taken in small businesses, they go there on their own’. ‘People who are illegally here will be desirable labor force in small business because they will be not admitted to other spheres’.
Actually relatively autonomous, independent systems of social stratifications and mobility exist in private and state-owned sectors. Availability of such autonomous systems destroys conventional institutes of upward mobility.
Private business and twilight, grey economy become an enforced lot of migrants of different ethnic origin because the public opinion is staunch in its rejection of migrants’ access to other spheres of employment (as public opinion surveys demonstrate, migrants’ access to private business is not welcomed). For migrants private sector is virtually the only chance to penetrate labor market.
Nowadays private business and twilight, ‘grey’ economy performs role of alternative channels of social mobility for migrants from other ethnic groups, very much like similar functions were performed by the political machine and racket in the USA.
However the public perceives this forced nature of migrants’ involvement in private business and twilight economy as a conscious choice dictated by a national tradition: ‘Persons of Caucasian origin have been engaged in trade from immemorial time’ (Astrakhan, 2005). ‘It is the tradition inherited from ancestors, specialization of the nation’; ‘They (Azerbaijanis) are trade people by tradition’; ‘Armenians have a predisposition for construction’ (Samara, 2004). ‘Sure, every nation has a certain historical destiny: some people catch fish, other people deal in vegetable or sell something while still other people pursue science’ (Astrakhan, 2004).
There is a staunch and stable belief that due to the abovementioned reasons people from Caucasus are purposefully oriented to trade, services sphere where they are sufficiently successful. It is more difficult to identify ‘traditional’ spheres of activity for migrants from Central Asia: they are also engaged in trade, services but in these businesses they act not as entrepreneurs but as hired workers performing hard, low paid duties. In particular, that is to be said in respect of Vietnamese, Tadjiks and Uzbeks. Migrants are very visible in trade and services: ‘Azerbaijanis enjoy priority in trade both wholesale and retail trade; they work very much, they keep very many sales outlets in catering and services; Georgians, Armenians, Gypsies as well as local people keep some outlets too’; ‘If we consider markets we’ll see that Koreans, Uzbeks, Tadjuks, Kirghizians, Kazakhs… Vietnamese are engaged there’. ‘Uzbeks and Azerbaijanis comprises the greater part of sales persons in market trade’ (Samara, 2004).
At the same time an obvious hierarchy is observed in retail trade: Koreans, Armenians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis dominate at the elite Gubernski market of Samara city while Tadjiks, Uzbeks and Azerbaijanis dominate at Troitski market which is considered to be a worse, more dirty place. That says much about ‘table of ranks’ that various migrant communities occupy in public opinion.
An employer has objective interest in official registration of his/her employees. However ‘if work is seasonal, does not require high skills, temporary then people with no registration have better chances because in this case they may be hired with no accountability to the control bodies… Reasons are numerous but the principal reason is as follows: people can be hired for a lower wages, first of all, in construction’ (Astrakhan, 2004).
Reasons are obvious: ‘Local people do not want to perform hard and rough work; such work is taken by nonresident aliens who desperately need money and tolerate conditions they live and work in. Thus norms of labor protection are violated, basic sanitary standards are not observed. Therefore local folk will never engage in such work’ (Samara, 2004).
Alongside with lack of legal grounds to stay and work lack of proper skills and poor command of Russian language play important role in concentration of ethnic minorities members in construction industry. ‘People arrive without knowledge of [Russian] language, with low skills even in construction’. However even high skills do not help: ‘All works that require high skills (mounting, mechanical works, roofing and plumbing) are performed by local people because performance of such works requires a certificate of welder, permit to work. If a new comer has necessary skills, he has Tadjik documents that are of no use here. Stuccowork is the best work we may aspire for’. (Samara, 2004).
A peculiar hierarchy has emerged in construction as well as at markets: Armenian, Ukrainian construction workers as the most skilled ones get better wages that are not as high as wages paid to Russians but significantly higher than wages paid to Tadjiks and Uzbeks. ‘Russian construction workers’ labor is the most expensive; Ukrainians and Byelorussians follow Russians; our people (Armenians) are relatively well paid. And then natives of Central Asia, Moldavians, Uzbeks, Tadjiks, Vietnamese etc. follow’; Rough and hard work in construction is made by people who migrated from Central Asia. Any job which requires a bit higher skills (foremen, stuccowork, painting) is performed by Azerbaijanis and Armenians’.
Labor of Tadjiks and Uzbeks who agree to perform the most hard and poorly paid physical works is most widely employed; ‘Uzbeks, Tadjiks are employed mainly for performance of rough construction works. They dominate there’; ‘It is exceptionally cheap labor’.
Tadjiks and Uzbeks agree to work in construction for wages that are repulsive and unacceptable for local construction workers or workers of other ethnic origin. ‘Tadjiks and Uzbeks are paid much lower wages than wages paid to representatives of other national groups’; ‘In construction Uzbeks and Tadjiks get no what they deserve. Russians or Georgians will not work for such wages’.
Even major enterprises including state-owned ones descend from use of virtually free labor of migrants from Central Asia: ‘Very many factories hire Tadjiks for construction works. These people work for a piece of bread’. (Samara, 2004)
Besides wage discrimination in construction industry people from Central Asia face with direct flagrant deceit when the performed work is not paid or paid partially.
Azerbaijanis and Tadjiks reject an idea of competition outright. Their standard statement is: ‘There is so much work that it is enough for everybody’. Probably, they are not absolutely sincere: ‘For some time, in mid-1990s when there were not so many Tadjiks here Ukrainian workers were the most competitive. They took up any work and squeezed wages down… Thank God!... They adjusted economy and all of them went beck to home and left there. Nowadats nobody undercuts prices here’ (Samara, 2005, Tadjiks).
Price discrimination has direct effect on level of migrants’ labor wages. Differences in incomes of Azerbaijanis and Tadjiks who occupy different ladders of the social hierarchy are significant and amount to 1.5 times. (Sure, an important role in this case plays other factors, i.e., duration of staying in Russia, diversification of spheres of employment etc. According to surveys performed in Astrakhan and Samara about one half of Tadjiks are engaged exactly in construction, from one fourth (in Astrakhan) to one third of them (in Samara) are employed in wholesale and retail trade).
Those migrants who due to their skills, education, job, cannot aspire for good wages make up their disadvantages by more intensive labor. According to E. Tyuryukanova, average length of migrants’ work weak is 66 hours. According to G. Vikovskaya, it is equal to 53 hours. 79% of Moldavian construction workers employed in Russia worked 12-13 hours a day or longer time. This practice is very widely spread among migrants who arrived for a short time. Labor migrants from Central Asia employed on the most heavy, unskilled jobs and ruthlessly exploited constitute an exception from this rule; even if they extend their work weak they are unable to achieve the average wage of Russian workers. According to surveys of 2005, if wages of Azerbaijanis illegal migrants amounted to 17 388 roubles Tadjiks’ wages amounted to 7 361 roubles, wages of legal migrant workers were 17 736 and 7 000 roubles, respectively.
It should be noted that even in Moscow where wages are rather high nearly a half of Azerbaijanis live difficult enough; 5.7% of them think that ‘it is impossible to tolerate such miserable conditions’, 34.8% think that ‘life is difficult but it still can be tolerated’; 35.1% of respondents think that they can ‘afford some necessities but purchase of expensive goods causes difficulties’ while for 12.4% of interviewed people said that they have ‘enough money only for food and 1.8% said that their incomes ‘do not allow them to buy even food and they have to borrow permanently’ (Moscow, 2005). Tadjik migrants are in the worst situation: for example, in Astrakhan 30.9% of interviewed migrants had “money that is sufficient only for food’ and 7.2% did not have enough money to feed themselves and had to borrow permanently’ (Astrakhan, 2005).
Labor of overwhelming majority of migrants is of forced character. In all countries migrant workers, particularly those who are illegal migrants, are subject to risk to become victims of forced recruitment and employment practices. Due to linkages between employers and law enforcement bodies and corruption these risks in Russia increase manifold.
Delays of wages and non-payment of wages, holding of ID or other personal valuables, threat to betray illegal migrants to authorities that will extradite them have became routine social practices long ago. According to investigation performed by G. S. Vitkovskaya, 25% of migrants have to work overtime, 20% have to perform work which does not fall in their standard duties, 28% of respondents suffer from underpayments and 13% experience permanent delays of wages.
According to E. Tyuryukanova’s research, employers take passports of migrants and hold these documents in more than in 20% of cases. Only 37% migrants noted that they are free to leave their employers. 18% of interviewed migrants in Moscow and 15% in Stavropol region said that they owe debts to their employers. Thereat, as a rule, amount of debt exceeds a monthly wage of a migrant. 31% of migrants in Moscow were restricted in freedom of movement and were kept under lock and key. The most common form of compulsion to work is compulsion to work longer hours without extra payment, to work with greater intensity, long delays of wages, compulsion to perform work to which a person has not given his consent.
According to results of poll made in 2003, 70% of Tadjik workers in Russia did not come out from places of their work where they lived. Among migrants interviewed in Moscow and Stavropol region we could not find a single person who had not experienced any form of violence and compulsion. There were 27% of such lucky migrants in Omsk. Expert suppose that over a half (56%) of migrants are involved in compulsory work. At the same time a third of experts think that all or nearly all migrants are involved, to some extent, in compulsory work. This estimate seems to be close to the real truth.
One more important moment is to be mentioned: migrants of different ethnic origin often encounter the direct denials of employment on the only grounds of their ethnic origin. Experimental check of discrimination against members of migratory minorities in the sphere of employment performed in Astrakhan and Samara in 2002 and 2004 demonstrated common use of such practices: discrimination was discovered in 21 of total 185 recorded cases of employment or in 11.4% of attempts to get a job (Astrakhan, Samara, 2004). Even greater incidence of discrimination was recorded in a pilot survey (Astrakhan, Samara, 2002). In addition to denial of employment facts of discrimination in payment of labor and in work conditions were recorded. At the same time cases of an inversed discrimination were found.
It should be taken into account that the obtained results are rather understated than exaggerated. In private sector employers pay less attention to national origin of an applicant than it is the case in budget organizations.
A vicious circle is emerging: rejection of migrants by recipient community and authorities (alongside with and in addition to objective circumstances that limit migrants access to worthy jobs) forms specific social practices of migrants’ absorption into local labor markets and migrants’ performance at these markets.
Process of ethnic groups’ stratification in employment sphere (at least, in construction industry, trade, catering) develops. Hierarchy of ethnic groups as well as other groups is emerging. In this structure quite definite niches are assigned for members of minorities. Neither majority nor other minorities or authorities welcome attempts to get out of these niches. For example, Azerbaijani experts noted that negative attitude toward Azerbaijanis often increases exactly in moments when they start to negotiate the Moscow environment in an organic way. Striving to leave their old niche (for example, market trade) they cannot find a new one and encounter administrative and other obstacles (Moscow, 2004).
At the same time members of some minorities accept ethno-social stratification as the prescribed entity and find peculiar forms of a given employment securing. For example, when Tadjik workers get an exceptionally lucrative order for performance of work that are made predominantly by local construction workers Tadjiks transfer such order to local workers and avoid competition and confrontation: ‘I shall not do main bricklaying even if they offer me wages at the level of what local folk get. This national policy is their business. I have never tried to get there. If there is a work and I’m given a great load of it I’ll make a phone call and say: ‘Sasha, I’m offered a good job, a huge scope of work. Do you have extra people? Come and place them. If you have no extra people the work will disappear’. He answers: ‘Why don’t you take it yourself?’ I reply: ‘It’s not our business. It’s not my job’. The rationale is as follows: ‘Russian brother will be offended. Main external bricklaying is the job for local people’ (Samara, 2005. Local construction workers, in their turn, transfer non-remunerative orders to Tadjiks).
Many Tadjik temporary labor migrants employ a strategy of adaptation which P. Sorokin defined as pseudo-ideational one. This strategy is characterized by minimization of spiritual and corporal needs and that minimization is imposed by external forces.
Forced, compulsory labor, discrimination, limited chances of social mobility for migrants that accompany compulsory labor and discrimination impede migrants’ acculturation and even more so their integration. As one of experts emphasized, ‘models that are accepted for use are due to immediate micro-environment in which this individual and social group he belong to live. Vulgar environment makes its print mark on a person who is unaccustomed to urban way of life. That…creates new distances’.
Another expert noted: ‘Low professional status does not imply a positive adaptation strategy. It is limited by that segment of economy where the person can employ his skills’ (Moscow, 2003). In its turn, insufficient, weak adaptation of some migratory minorities to recipient community sets flywheel in motion again and again.
Discrimination at housing market
Situation at housing market is no less serious. Owner of housing first of all pays attention to the fact whether a potential tenant is local or a visitant and after that to a potential tenant’s national (ethnic) origin. These characteristics are intimately intertwined. Other factors (registration, presence of little children, family status, citizenship, occupation/activity) are by far less significant while gender and age are, most likely, not taken into account when housing is leased out.
According to experts, in Astrakhan Chechens have the least chance to rent housing (‘If you are a Tatar, you will pay one price, if you are a Chechen your will pay another, higher price’ — Astrakhan, 2005) and Romany, natives of Dagestan, Tadjiks and Uzbeks. In Samara the most discriminated ethnic groups are Romany, Tadjiks, Chechens, Uzbeks, Azerbaijanis (Astrakhan, 2004; Samara, 2004).
Denial of lease to an ethnic migrant may be explained by quite pragmatic considerations: ‘If I lease out I’ll not make account of payment; for me my own security and safety of house are more important’. According to weighty opinion of a realtor, ‘Tadjiks, Gypsies, Chechens, Azerbaijanis, natives of Dagestan, Georgians (if they are married to Russians they still have some chance to lease a housing), Uzbeks, Kreans, actually to everyone who is not local inhabitant’ are denied a lease” (Samara, 2004).
To overcome a denial migrants have to overpay: ‘People try to lease housing to persons of Caucasian origin and migrants from Central Asia for higher pay’; ‘Sure, inhabitants of Central Asia and Caucasus have to pay for rented housing more than local people pay’ (Astrakhan, 2005). Estimates are available: if Azerbaijanis try to lease housing they will probably pay 1.5 times more that local people, Armenians will pay twofold more. Even greater multipliers have been mentioned (Astrakhan, 2004). A professional realtor says: ‘If they convinced me there is 25% probability that it will be difficult for me to convince owners to agree even to the amount they defined themselves. If rate increases owners, as a rule, accept tenants but then it is necessary to make contract of lease, to execute an act of transfer of property in the apartment. An owner may even demand an insurance of his property because he is afraid of aliens’ (Samara, 2004).
Price is not always the decisive factor. Even if housing renting costs do not exceed limits of generally accepted price dispersion ethnic migrants confront harsher or formalized terms of lease. This observation confirms opinion of a realtor: ‘In such cases a landlord tries to get pre-payment for a half of a year or for a year’; ‘Azerbaijanis have to pay for a half of a year in advance; international, long-distance communication line is switched off’; ‘He will pay more for housing which will be leased out for a shorter term’ (Samara, 2004).
Markets of housing for ethnic migrants are steadily being differentiated depending on condition of housing, peculiarities of social status and behavior of owners, social roles performed by members of minorities.
Virtually in all regions of Russia one may find in personal classified ads about lease of housing statements like ‘only for Russians’, ‘only for Russian family’. Statements like ‘persons of Caucasian origin shall not apply for’ are more rare (16.7 thousand ads on housing lease out and 9.4 thousand of ads on willingness to rent housing published in bulletins of free of charge announcements in 20 cities of Russia in 2002-2004 have been analyzed). Share of such ads is particularly high in major cities of southern Russia that experienced influx of migrants of other ethnic origins earlier than other regions (migrants influx in Stavropol and Saratov was 25% and 15%, respectively). Taking into consideration demand-supply situation at housing market persons in search of housing often indicate their national/ethnic origin themselves. (In such ads origin is indicated only by Russians). Share of such ads comprises 31% in Volgograd, 26% in Saratov, 25% in Samara, 22% in Stavropol, 23% in Moscow, 19% in Saint Petersburg and about 15% in Irkutsk and Nizhni Novgorod.
Share of ads that reflect landlords’ bias against members of certain national minorities and are posted in public places is even higher: 22.6% in Volgograd, 28.8% in Stavropol (Volgograd, October-December, 2002, 230 private posted ads; Stavropol, October-December, 2003, 208 ads). In particular, such ads are widely spread in peripheral, proletarian districts.
Up to a half of potential lessees in search of housing indicate their national/ethnic origin; in Volgograd in 409 posted ads (from the total of 811 ads) lessees indicated their national/ethnic origins. A realtor calculated that in a sample of 290 landlords’ ads 279 announced that owner would like to lease out to Russians. Two other intermediaries thought that about 90% of owner would like to lease out housing to Russians (Stavropol, 2003). In Orenburg about 60-90% of owners would prefer to deal with Slavic lessees (2002, opinion poll performed in 5 real estate agencies).
Pilot survey of situation at housing market performed by method of appeals to landlords has confirmed presence of stable bias which precludes subletting to natives of Caucasus, Central Asia and to Romany6. In a third of volunteers’ attempts to take housing on lease denial motivated by national prejudices was registered. Natives of Caucasus are most often declined as lessees (Astrakhan, 2004).
Emergence of enclaves, areas of particular ethnic groups’ settlement creates a serious threat of accelerated separation of the migrants that are the least adapted to urban environment. At the present time, as surveys in Astrakhan and Samara demonstrate, such processes develop predominantly around major trade outlets and other places of migrants’ massive employment. These processes develop also in Moscow, in other major cities of Russia. According to O. Vendina, ‘washing-out’ of middle class from urban districts that concentrate the most acute social, housing and environmental problems and subsequent replacement of middle class with migrants cause formation of areas of ethnic groups’ compact settlement. Possibility of such prediction’s realization is higher in outskirts than in downtowns or other prestigious districts because “representatives of higher strata of society from notional minorities will prefer environment which will be more congenial to them in social, not in ethnic terms’.
Intolerance of recipient population is a significant factor of tension between migrants and local people. However discriminatory social practices do not contribute to overcoming walls that separate migrants and recipient population. Besides that, discriminatory practices promote ethnic-social stratification of various groups of ethnic migrants. That cannot but destabilize social and inter-ethnic relations.
Struggle against discrimination is an important prerequisite of migrants’ social adaptation, transferal of some social and cultural differences between migrants and recipient population from category of ‘significant differences’ to category of ‘insignificant ones’.
Otherwise it is inevitable that a social model which will include ethnic-social stratification as its important characteristic will emerge in the contemporary Russian society. There are symptoms that this process is under way and that it is due not the least to the fact that ethnic and social stratification becomes actually the only basis of strategy of interaction between the recipient population and migrants of different ethnic origins. A social convention based upon such stratification can be relatively effective in the short run. However it does not meet the long-term objectives of Russian society development because it canalizes social communications and social ties, transforms social values, reproduces profile of segmented society with respective buildup of potential for conflict and saps foundations of civil society in making.
 Note of V. I. Mukomel, the Project Chief: this section presents results of research performed no only within framework of this project but also within framework of other projects led by V. Mukomel in 2002-2006 and sponsored by grants allocated to CERPS and the Institute of Sociology RAS (Russian Foundation for Humanities, “Liberal Mission”).
 Ãàëëÿìîâ Ð.Ð. Ýòíîñîöèàëüíàÿ ñòðàòèôèêàöèÿ îáùåñòâà: òåîðåòè÷åñêèå ïîäõîäû è êîíöåïòóàëüíàÿ ìîäåëü. // Ìåæäèñöèïëèíàðíûå èññëåäîâàíèÿ â êîíòåêñòå ñîöèàëüíî-êóëüòóðíîé àíòðîïîëîãèè. / Îòâ. ðåä. Ì. Í. Ãóáîãëî. Èí-ò ýòíîëîãèè è àíòðîïîëîãèè ÐÀÍ. – Ì.: Íàóêà, 2005. ñ. 193. (R.R. Gallyamov. Ethno-social stratification of the society: theoretical approaches and conceptual model.//Interdisciplinary studies in context of social-cultural anthropology/Chief editor: M.N. Guboglo. Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology RAS. Moscow: Nauka, 2005, p. 193).
 53 experts have been interviewed. Results of surveys made in Astrakhan and Samara regions in 2004-2005 and in Astrakhan, Volgograd, Orenburg, Samara and Saratov regions in 2002 are given hereinafter.
 Anthropological peculiarities allow members of the recipient community to identify ethnic-social boundary: ‘Much depends on appearance, shape of nose, hair color’; ‘The matter is not in a particular ethnic origin but rather in appearance’ (Samara, 2004).
 It is remarkable that officers of private employment services quite unambiguously indicate labor market as the principal sphere of discrimination while officers of real estate agencies indicate housing market as the sphere of discrimination.
 Çàñëàâñêàÿ Ò.È. Ñîöèåòàëüíàÿ òðàíñôîðìàöèÿ ðîññèéñêîãî îáùåñòâà: Äåÿòåëüíîñòíî-ñòðóêòóðíàÿ êîíöåïöèÿ. — Ì., Äåëî, 2002, ñ. 541. (T. I. Zaslavskaya. Societal transformation of the Russian society: Activity-structural conception. Moscow, Delo, 2002, p. 541).
 In a sense it is not the worst case scenario: as Yu. V. Arutyunov demonstrated, private sector has definitive advantages in comparison to the state sector in respect of social mobility. (Àðóòþíîâ Þ. Â. Òðàíñôîðìàöèÿ ïîñòñîâåòñêèõ íàöèé: ïî ìàòåðèàëàì ýòíîñîöèîëîãè÷åñêèõ èññëåäîâàíèé. Èíñòèòóò ýòíîëîãèè è àíòðîïîëîãèè Ðàí. – Ì.: Íàóêàá 2003, ñ. 44; Yu. V. Arutyunov. Transformation of post-Soviet nations: results of ethno-sociological studies. Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology RAS. — Moscow: Nauka, 2003, p. 44).
 Ìåðòîí Ð.Ê. ßâíûå è ëàòåíòíûå ôóíêöèè// Àìåðèêàíñêàÿ ñîöèîëîãè÷åñêàÿ ìûñëü: Òåêñòû / Ïîä ðåä. Â. È. Äîáðåíüêîâà. — Ì.: Èçäàíèå Ìåæäóíàðîäíîãî Óíèâåðñèòåòà Áèçíåñà è Óïðàâëåíèÿ, 1996, ñ. 456. (R. C. Merton. Explicit and latent functions // American sociological thought: Texts / V. I. Dobren’kov (ed.) — Moscow: International University of Business and Management publication, 1996, p. 456). R. Merton quotes W. White’s words: ‘Politics and racket proved to be important means of social mobility for persons who, due to their ethnic origin and low social status could not promote through ‘respectable channels’ (Ibid., p. 457).
 Ïðèíóäèòåëüíûé òðóä â ñîâðåìåííîé Ðîññèÿ. Íåðåãóëèðóåìàÿ ìèãðàöèÿ è òîðãîâëÿ ëþäüìè / ÌÎÒ. – Ì.: Ïðàâà ÷åëîâåêà, 2004, ñ.59. (Forced labor in present day Russia. Unregulated migration and traffic in human beings./ ILO. – Moscow, Prava cheloveka, 2004, p. 59).
 Ïðîáëåìû íåçàêîííîé ìèãðàöèè â Ðîññèè: ðåàëèè è ïîèñê ðåøåíèé (ïî èòîãàì ñîöèîëîãè÷åñêîãî îáñëåäîâàíèÿ) / ÌÎÌ, Áþðî ÌÎÌ â Ðîññèè. – Ì.: Ãåíäàëüô, 2004, ñ. 122. (Problems of illegal migration in Russia: realities and quest of solutions (according to results of sociological survey) / ILO, ILO Bureau in Russia. – Moscow: Gandalph, 2004, p. 122.
 Ìîøíÿãà Â., Ðóñíàê Ã. Ìû ñòðîèì Åâðîïó. È íå òîëüêî… Ìîëä. Ãîñ. Óí-ò. Öåíòð “CAPTES”. – Êèøèíåâ: CEP USM, 2005, c. 27 (V. Moshnyaga, G. Rusnak. We are building Europe. And not only that… Moldavian State Unversity. ‘CAPTES’ Center. – Kishiniov: CEP USM, 2005, p. 27).
 Median values are 10 000, 6 000, 13 9000 and 6 250 roubles, respectively. Azerbaijanis were interviewed in Moscow, Astrakhan and Samara (376 respondents disclosed their wages) and Tadjiks in Astrakhan and Samara (183 respondents).
 Ïðîáëåìû íåçàêîííîé ìèãðàöèè â Ðîññèè: ðåàëèè è ïîèñê ðåøåíèé (ïî èòîãàì ñîöèîëîãè÷åñêîãî îáñëåäîâàíèÿ) / ÌÎÌ, Áþðî ÌÎÌ â Ðîññèè. – Ì.: Ãåíäàëüô, 2004, ñ. 131. (Problems of illegal migration in Russia: realities and quest of solutions (according to results of sociological survey) / ILO, ILO Bureau in Russia. – Moscow: Gandalph, 2004, p. 131).
 Òðóäîâàÿ ìèãðàöèÿ â ñòðàíàõ Öåíòðàëüíîé Àçèè, Ðîññèéñêîé Ôåäåðàöèè, Àôãàíèñòàíå è Ïàêèñòàíå. Àíàëèòè÷åñêèé îáçîð. – Àëìàòû: ÅÊ ÌÎÌ, 2005, ñ. 45 (Labor migration in Central Asian countries, the Russian Federation, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Analytical review – Almaty, ILO Commision for Europe, 2005, p. 45).
 Forced labor in present day Russia, pp. 66, 68.
 Forced labor in present day Russia, p. 51.
 Methods of survey see in: Íàöèîíàëüíûå ìåíüøèíñòâà. Ïðàâîâûå îñíîâû è ïðàêòèêà îáåñïå÷åíèÿ ïðàâ ëèö, ïðèíàäëåæàùèõ ê íàöèîíàëüíûõ ìåíüøèíñòâàì, â ñóáúåêòàõ þãà Ðîññèéñêîé Ôåäåðàöèè / Ïîä ðåä. Â. Ìóêîìåëÿ. — Ì.: CERPS, 2003, ñ. 121-124 (National minorities. Legal grounds and practice of ensuring of rights of people belonging to national minorities in constituent parts of south of the Russian Federation / V. Mukomel (ed.), Moscow, … 2003, pp. 121-124.
 Ñîðîêèí Ïèòèðèì. Ñîöèàëüíàÿ è êóëüòóðíàÿ äèíàìèêà: Èññëåäîâàíèå èçìåíåíèé â áîëüøèõ ñèñòåìàõ èñêóññòâà, èñòèíû, ýòèêè, ïðàâà è îáùåñòâåííûõ îòíîøåíèé. — ÑÏá.: ÐÕÃÈ, 2000, ñ. 50. (Pitirim Sorokin. Social and cultural dynamics: Investigation of changes in big systems of arts, truth, ethics, law and social relations. Saint Petersburg: RCGI, 2000, p. 50).
 For greater details see: Ìóêîìåëü Â. È. Ìèãðàöèîííàÿ ïîëèòèêà Ðîññèè: ïîñòñîâåòñêèå êîíòåêñòû / Èíñòèòóò ñîöèîëîãèè ÐÀÍ. — Ì.: Äèïîëü-Ò, 2005, ñ. 235-237. (V. I. Mukomel. Migration policy of Russia: post-Soviet contexts / Institute of Sociology RAS. Moscow, Dipole-T, 2005, p. 235-237).
 Îëüãà Âåíäèíà. Ìèãðàíòû â Ìîñêâå: ãðîçèò ëè ðîññèéñêîé ñòîëèöå ýòíè÷åñêàÿ ñåãðåãàöèÿ? / Îáùàÿ ðåä. Æ. Çàéîí÷êîâñêîé. — Ì.: 2005, ñ. 78 (Olga Vendina. Migrants in Moscow: is ethnic segregation a menace to Russian capital? /J. Zaionchkovskaya (Gen. ed.) — Moscow, 2005, p. 78)